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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory of endogenous di§erences in liquidity of assets based on the interaction
between di§erences in their risk and di§erences in liquidity needs of investors. An equilibrium of the
model, which always exists and is unique, displays a class structure, where investors’ types sort themselves
across di§erent types of assets. I also provide a detailed analysis of the possible types of sorting and of
the consequences for the cross-sectional properties of asset prices and their velocity. The framework can
also be useful to think about what constitute a "flight-to-liquidity" and a "safe asset."
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1 Introduction
Assets di§er greatly in their risk and liquidity characteristics. Although the early asset pricing literature
focused exclusively on the role of risk,1 it has since been recognized that liquidity can be an important factor
in the pricing of an asset.2 However, it is not clear whether we should expect any systematic relationship
between risk and liquidity, and if yes under what conditions and what that relationship would be. The
existence of a systematic relationship could be important. First, it would mean that risk and liquidity
premia are not independent, which would have implications for asset pricing. More generally, a systematic
relationship could also matter for the way data is used to infer the liquidity of asset markets and for the
formulation of policy decisions.
In this paper I propose a theory of endogenous di§erences in the liquidity of assets based on the di§erences
in their risk, where by liquidity of an asset I mean the extent to which it facilitates trade as a means of
payment or collateral, and I study the implications of the theory for the role of individual and aggregate
risks in the cross-sectional variations in asset returns and in velocity of trade, and for the decomposition of
asset returns into risk and liquidity premia. The di§erentiated sensitivity to risk of the value of liquidity
services of assets for agents with di§erent liquidity needs leads to endogenous di§erences in liquidity premia
and in velocity of trade of assets despite the absence of di§erences in the cost or ease of trade. I also show
that the model can help us think about what constitutes a "flight-to-liquidity" or a "safe" asset.
More specifically, I design a simple asset pricing model, which is a standard consumption-based Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) augmented with features of the model of exchange of Rocheteau and Wright
(2005) to incorporate heterogeneous liquidity needs. On one side of the market, there are consumers, who,
like in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), may want to consume early, i.e., before assets mature. Consumers
only di§er in the frequency of their liquidity needs, in that they have di§erent probabilities of wanting to
consume early. On the other side of the market, there are claims that all have the same maturity, with
their only payout being at maturity. All claims have the same expected payouts at maturity, but they di§er
in a risk parameter ϵ, which determines the covariance of these payo§s with those of the market portfolio:
the covariance with the market portfolio increases with ϵ, and low-ϵ are thus said to be less risky than
higher-ϵ claims. All claims are intrinsically perfectly liquid, i.e., they can be traded at all times without any
restrictions or delay and at no cost. Hence, any di§erence in the value of liquidity services across assets must
be driven by di§erences in their risk. Importantly, the intensity of liquidity needs of early consumers and
the terms of trade that they face when consuming early are allowed to be state-dependent.
The first main result of the paper is that the equilibrium displays a class structure, by which I mean
that each type of consumer belongs to a given group, which can be constituted of more than one type of
consumers, all consumers of that group only hold onto assets with risk parameter ϵ in a certain range, and
assets with risk parameter in this range are held only by consumers in this group. The intuition for this
class structure is as follows. For a given portfolio, all consumers price risk at maturity the same way, but
consumers of di§erent types value liquidity services di§erently, because of their the di§erentiated frequency
of liquidity needs. Hence, in equilibrium the di§erent types of consumers choose di§erent portfolios and
1See, for instance, the CAPM or the consumption-based asset pricing literature that followed Lucas (1978).
2A non-exhaustive list of theoretical contributions includes Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Kiyotaki and Moore
(2005), Du¢e, et al. (2005), Weill (2008), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), Lagos (2010), Geromichalos et al. (2007),
Rocheteau (2011), and Jacquet and Tan (2012). See also Amihud et al. (2012), Foucault et al. (2013), or Vayanos
and Wang (2013) for extensive reviews of the empirical and theoretical literatures.
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assets are held and priced by consumers with the highest marginal valuation for these kind of assets.
A direct consequence of the existence of classes is that the asset pricing function is not linear in the risk
parameter ϵ, it is piecewise linear and convex. It is piecewise linear because agents’ marginal valuation of
assets changes linearly with risk within a class and the slope of the asset pricing function changes whenever
one moves from one class to another. And it is convex because safer (riskier) assets are held by consumers
whose marginal valuation of assets is most (least) sensitive to risk. I also show that, when one considers
rates of return rather than prices, it is possible to derive formulae predicting asset returns that are similar to
those of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), but with a number of notable di§erences. First, because
the asset pricing function is not linear whenever there exists more than one class, the model can generate
absolute excess returns. Second, although the only factor in the model is risk, one can decompose the excess
returns (beyond absolute excess returns) of a risky asset relative to the risk-free asset into risk and liquidity
premia: the risk premium is determined by the additional return an illiquid risky asset must pay relative
to an illiquid risk-free claims, while the liquidity premium is an adjustment to the risk-free rate of a liquid
claim to take into account the covariance between returns at maturity and the liquidity services provided by
a claim. But because di§erences in liquidity services originate from di§erences in risk, the risk and liquidity
premia of an asset must be determined jointly. Moreover, the premia are not uniquely defined, for they are
specific to a type of consumers and there can be more than one type of agents holding a given asset type.
The second main result of the paper is the characterization of the relationship between the risk of a
claim and the liquidity needs of consumers holding this type of claims. It is not obvious which way sorting
should take place, for agents can adjust their portfolios along two dimensions, its average risk and size,
to insure themselves against their liquidity needs. To do so I consider the case where there are two types
of consumers who are endowed with the same utility function for early and late consumption, and where
the function belongs to the family of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions. I show
that there exists a unique equilibrium, which is such that high-liquidity need consumers always hold onto
portfolios that are larger than lower-liquidity-need consumers,. Furthermore, the type of sorting observed in
equilibrium is driven by how the ratio of (i) the marginal value of claims for early consumers when wanting
to consume early to (ii) the marginal value of claims at maturity for late consumers, which is common to all
types with the CRRA assumption, covaries with the risk of the market portfolio at maturity: If this ratio
of marginal values is negatively correlated with the payouts of the market portfolio, then there is positive
sorting, where by positive sorting I mean that high-liquidity need consumers choose portfolios that have a
lower covariance with the market portfolio than low-liquidity need consumers, and vice versa for negative
sorting. Moreover, if the liquidity needs of the two types of consumers are not too di§erent, then there exists
one class in equilibrium, but with high-liquidity-need consumers holdings portfolios with a lower covariance
with the market portfolio than low-liquidity-need consumers; while two classes appear otherwise, in which
case high-liquidity need consumers hold all claims with covariance below a certain cuto§ and low-liquidity
need consumers hold the rest. That is, a segmentation of the asset market necessitates a large enough
di§erence in consumers’ liquidity needs. The sorting of consumers across claims of di§erent risk parameter
depends on the correlation of the ratio of marginal utilities with that of the market portfolio’s payo§ because
all consumers value more claims that pay relatively more in states where the ratio of marginal utilities is
high, but disproportionately more so for consumers with high liquidity needs.
A consequence of sorting is that it creates a clientele e§ect : the velocity of a type of asset is driven
by the frequency of the liquidity needs of the consumers holding it. The clientele e§ect implies that when
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using velocity to measure the liquidity of assets, some assets might appear more liquid than others even
though there are no intrinsic di§erences in their tradeability. Moreover, the composition of portfolios is not
necessarily pinned down, implying that the relationship between liquidity premium and velocity is positive
on average only,3 and that the composition of portfolios can change over time for specific assets, even in
the absence of changes in the fundamentals of the economy. The paper thus calls for caution in using the
velocity of assets as a guide to their liquidity. In particular, the model predicts that velocity may not be a
valid instrument for intrinsic liquidity properties of assets.
I then show that the theory can be used to think about what constitutes a safe asset as well as understand
what a "flight-to-safety" is. In fact, when sorting is positive, an increase in the risk of the market portfolio
resulting from an increase in the individual risk of a mass of assets can simultaneously generate an increase
in the price and velocity of the safest assets, a fall in the price and velocity of the riskiest assets, and a
sharp drop in the price and velocity of the assets whose risk levels have increased. This rotation of the asset
pricing function happens because the increase in the amount of aggregate risk means a decrease (increase) in
the amount of resources in states where agents already consume relatively less (more) than average, which
triggers for all consumers an increase (decrease) in the marginal value of claims whose payo§s have a low
(high) enough covariance with the payo§s of the market portfolio. The response of the asset pricing function
thus means safe assets are doubly safe, for (i) their payo§s have a low covariance with those of the market
portfolio for a given level of aggregate risk and (ii) their price fluctuates counter-cyclically with aggregate
risk. And the extent to how safe an asset is is intimately linked to how liquid it is, for assets whose price rises
also see their velocity go up and vice versa. Finally, because the most liquid assets are the ones whose price
and velocity increases and vice versa, the model is generates what could be interpreted as a flight-to-liquidity,
but which really is a flight-to-safety.4 .
Related Literature - Among the growing literature that is interested in the role of market liquidity
for asset pricing, this paper is particularly related to the papers that are interested in the role of liquidity
di§erences and how these interact with risk in explaining the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns. In
Vayanos (2004), assets di§er exogenously in their transaction costs while investors are fund managers that
are subject to withdrawals when fund performance below a certain threshold. This generates a preference for
liquidity which is time varying and increasing in volatility, so that liquidity premia increase in volatile times.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) introduce di§erences in liquidity across assets, in the form of di§erentiated
transaction costs, in an otherwise standard consumption-based CAPM framework. Their main focus is on
the role of liquidity risk, i.e., the volatility of the transaction costs. Lagos (2010) studies a consumption-
based asset pricing model à la Lucas, but augmented to allow assets to also facilitate trade. He considers
two assets, a risk-free asset and a risky equity, and investigates theoretically and quantitatively the extent to
which the risk-free rate and equity premium puzzles can be explained once di§erences in liquidity are taken
into account. He and Milbradt (2014) study the interaction between default and liquidity for corporate bonds
that are traded in an over-the-counter market with search frictions in a model à la Du¢e et al. (2005). In
3Moreover, even though in the basic framework the negative relationship between risk and liquidity premium holds
on average, implying that the positive relationship between liquidity premium and velocity also holds on average, the
introduction of frictional illiquidity breaks this relationship. See section 3 of part 2 of the online appendix.
4Episodes of stress in financial markets are sometimes called "flights to liquidity," "flights to quality," or "flights
to safety." In the context of this paper all assets have the same intrinsic liquidity properties and the same quality, in
that there is no di§erence in asymmetry of information, and thus the most appropriate terminology is that of a "flight
to safety." See Guerreri and Shimer (2014) and Li et al. (2012) for environments that can generate, respectively,
flights to quality and flights to liquidity.
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their paper the risk faced by a bond holder is endogenous, because it depends on the endogenous default
decision by equity holders and the endogenous market liquidity, i.e., how easy to find a trading partner.
Assuming that defaulted bonds are less liquid than non-defaulted bonds, the authors show that the closer
a bond is to default, the more illiquid it is. There are therefore two important di§erences between these
papers and mine. First, they adopt a representative-agent framework and therefore cannot generate clientele
e§ects. Second, with the exception of one version of Lagos’ model, intrinsic di§erences in liquidity properties
of assets, in the form of di§erences in either the cost or ease of trade, play an essential role in explaining
di§erences in liquidity premia in these aforementioned papers, whereas this paper generates di§erences in
liquidity premia even when all assets are intrinsically equally liquid.
The paper is also related to the literature that is interested in the segmentation of markets with two-
sided heterogeneity. Jacquet and Tan (2007) and Bidner et al. (2014) build on the work of Burdett and
Coles (1997), Eeckhout (1999), and Smith (2006), and study how agents looking for a long-term partner
can endogenously sort themselves into di§erent markets when agents’ search strategy implies the existence
of a class structure. There also exists a literature that is interested in the segmentation of asset markets.
Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Guibaud et al. (2013) study models of the yield curve where agents sort
themselves into di§erent maturities, based on either a preferred-habitat assumption (in the former) or on the
part of an agent’s life-cycle (in the latter). Vayanos and Wang (2007) and Vayanos and Weill (2007) develop
models that explain why two assets with identical cash-flows can trade at di§erent prices through endogenous
di§erences in liquidity. In the former paper the di§erence is coming from a clientele e§ect where agents with
short or long trading horizons specialize in one or the other asset. In the latter work all agents have the same
trading horizon but there exist long and short traders. The authors show that there exists an asymmetric
equilibrium where the concentration of short traders in one asset increases the supply of that asset, which,
given the assumption of a matching function with increasing returns to scale, in turn increases the ease
with which trading partners are met, i.e., its liquidity, and thus its price. Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
Pagano (1989), and Studart (2014) also develop models of segmentation of asset markets with heterogeneous
agents and heterogeneous assets, but where the sorting of agents across assets originates from exogenous
and di§erentiated transaction costs. In these setups the clientele e§ect acts as an amplifier to the intrinsic
liquidity di§erences that the di§erentiated transaction costs represent, whereas in the present paper the main
results hold even when assets are all intrinsically equally liquid. This has consequences regarding whether
velocity or volume of trade and liquidity measures using these data are appropriate instruments for intrinsic
liquidity properties of assets.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature that investigates how shocks can impact asset prices
through changes in liquidity. Li et al. (2012), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), Chang (2014), and Shi (2005)
use related setups. The mechanisms in the first three papers are based on asymmetry of information, which
is absent here, and these papers and the present work are therefore complementary. Shi (2015) studies the
role of the saleability of assets and model liquidity shocks as a reduction in the stock of assets, which, like
in this paper, leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in asset prices (see section 1.1 in part 1 of the online
appendix). Cui and Radde (2016) and Del Negro et al. (2017) each identify a fix to this anomaly: the
introduction of nominal rigidities and a zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates in Del Negro et al.
and, like in this paper, a concomitant reduction in the ease of trade in Cui and Radde. Finally, Vayanos
(2004) also considers the interaction between changes in risk and changes in liquidity. In his model changes
in volatility triggers changes in liquidity premia because fund managers, who are subject to the threat of
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withdrawal of funds if they do not perform, worry more about having to bear transaction costs in times of
high volatility. However, as mentioned above, di§erences in the liquidity of assets in his model originate
from their exogenous di§erences in transaction costs.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic setup. I then derive the portfolio
problem in section 3 and present the formation of asset classes and some implications in Section 4. In section
5 I derive CAPM-like formulea, while section 6 contains a detailed analysis sorting in the case with two types
of agents. sections 7 considers implications of sorting and section 8 concludes. All proof of the results not
in the main text can be found, unless indicated otherwise, in the appendix at the end of this manuscript.
2 Setup
The environment is essentially a simple consumption-based CAPM in which I incorporate features of the
competitive model of exchange in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) to introduce liquidity needs in a tractable
way.
Physical Environment - There are three time periods indexed by t 2 {0, 1, 2}. The economy can be in
either of two states, information which is revealed at t = 1 before trade takes place. The state of the world
is indexed by ! 2 {l, h}, and I assume that the ex ante probability that the state of the economy is h is
πh = π and it is πl = 1− π for state l.
There is one perfectly divisible and perishable good, which is traded in standard Walrasian markets at
all dates.5
Agents - The economy is populated by two types of three-period lived agents who do not discount the
future. There is a mass one of each type of agents, who I call consumers and producers because of their
respective roles in the middle period. All producers are alike, whereas the population of consumers is split
into I types indexed by i 2 {1, ..., I}, with µi denoting the mass of consumers of type i. The type of an
agent is fixed and is known at t = 0.
All agents can consume and produce the good at t = 0, and an agent who consumes and produces
respectively c and h units of the good enjoys utility c− h for the period.
At t = 1 producers do not derive utility from consumption but they can produce the good. On the other
hand, consumers cannot produce and for each type i a randomly drawn fraction σi want to consume, they are
early consumers, while other consumers, the late consumers, do not obtain any utility out of consumption.
In this middle period when the state is !, a producer producing h units of the good bears a utility cost
(A!)−1h, while an early consumers obtains utility θ!u(c) out of consuming c units of consumption. I assume,
without loss of generality, that σ1 > σ2 > ... > σI > 0 and that consumers learn their preference shock at
date t = 1 before the aggregate state ! is revealed.
Finally, no production takes place at date t = 2. The utility of consuming c units is c for producers
while it is U(c) for early and late consumers.6 I assume that u and U are both strictly increasing and twice
continuously di§erentiable functions, that u is strictly concave with limc!0+ u0(c) = +1, and that U is
weakly concave.
I further assume that: (i) agents cannot commit to honor contracts; (ii) contracts cannot be enforced; and
5The results carry over if trade takes place in an over-the-counter (OTC) market at date t = 1 (see Jacquet, 2016).
6All the main results of the paper are essentially unchanged if one assumes that early consumers do not value
consumption in the last period.
6
(iii) agents are anonymous so that they cannot be punished for not abiding by a contract. These assumptions
imply that exchange must be quid pro quo, and in particular agents need a medium of exchange in the form
of either a means of payment or collateral at t = 1.7
Lucas Trees - There is a mass K > 0 of trees. Each tree is characterized by a distribution of delivery
of the good at date t = 2 over the two states of the world: the returns a tree of type ϵ in state h and l are
respectively given by
rhϵ = 1 + ϵ and r
l
ϵ = 1−
π
1− π ϵ, (1)
which ensures that in expected terms all trees yield one unit of the good at t = 2. Let r! ≡ (r!ϵ )ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax]
be the vector of claims’ returns in state !. It is assumed that ϵ is distributed over [ϵmin, ϵmax] according
to some cumulative distribution function (cdf ) G, with ϵmin ≤ 0 and ϵmax 2 [0, (1− π) /π].8 I assume, for
simplicity, that the distribution of risk is without mass points and denote by g the probability distribution
function (pdf ) of the distribution of risk associated with G, so that the risk of the market portfolio can be
defined by E = R ϵmax
ϵmin
ϵg(ϵ)dϵ ≥ 0. There is also a mass K of securities, with each security corresponding to
a claim to the returns to a given tree. I assume that securities cannot be stripped and repackaged, but they
can be freely traded in all periods, and in that sense all securities are intrinsically perfectly liquid.
Note, as indicated in the introduction, that ϵ drives the covariance of its returns with those of the market
portfolio at maturity, which is (π/(1−π))Eϵ. Low-ϵ claims are therefore lower risk claims than high-ϵ claims.9
Interpretation - The model is designed to capture the fact that most assets have a given maturity,
which is infinity for some, whereas investors do not know with certainty the timing of their liquidity needs
(for consumption or investment purposes), and some investors are more likely to face such liquidity needs.
This means investors regularly need to sell assets in their portfolio before they mature (there is a mismatch
between the maturity of assets in an agent’s portfolio and the timing of her consumption), which in turn
implies that agents care about more than just the risk of an asset at maturity.
The parameter ϵ is meant to capture the covariance of payo§s of an asset at maturity with those of the
market portfolio. A T-bill, for instance, would be a ϵ = 0 assets, because it pays the same amount in all
states of the world when it matures, whereas the stock of a blue chip company whose dividends do not
fluctuate much would be a low ϵ > 0 asset, and examples of ϵ = (1− π) /π assets would be the stock of a
highly-leveraged company that would file for bankruptcy in a recession or a call option that is in-the-money
only in state h.
The parameter σ captures the frequency of liquidity needs, which is state independent but type specific,
while θ measures the intensity of these needs and A impacts the terms of trade in the middle period, with
both A and θ being state-dependent but independent of the type of the agent. These feature of the model
aim at capturing the facts that (i) di§erent types of investors face di§erent liquidity needs through di§erences
in the frequency of liquidity needs, and (ii) the extent of the liquidity needs can vary with market conditions
through the variations in A and θ.
7There is no di§erence in the current setup between selling an asset and obtaining credit by putting the asset
down as collateral, as long as the entire asset can serve as collateral. I studythe impact of frictions that restrict the
fraction of a tree that can be used as collateral in section 3 of part 2 of the online appendix .
8 It is possible to assume that the lower bound is strictly positive without changing any of the results.
9 If we take the model literally, ϵ also drives the variance of payo§s of a claim at maturity. However, a more general
interpretation of the model is that there is some idiosyncratic risk associated with each claim, i.e., the return of a
claim in state ! is given by r!,zϵ with z drawn from a distribution with cdf F , but that a law of large numbers applies
so that the realized payo§ of the subportfolio made of ϵ-type claims in an agent’s portfolio is always r!ϵ =
R
r!,zϵ dF (z)
in state !.
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Consumers in the model can be interpreted as being investors - like pension funds, Money Market Mutual
Funds (MMMF), Mutual Funds (MF), commercial and investment banks, life insurance companies, hedge
funds or non-financial corporations, which have funds to invest but also face the possibility of having to
liquidate part of their portfolio because of liquidity needs - unusually large withdrawal of funds by depositors
or holders of shares, termination of insurance policies, or cash-flow needs. These di§erent types of investors
tend to have di§erent liquidity needs: withdrawal of funds is typically much easier for funds invested in a
MF or regular deposit accounts at a bank than it is for a hedge funds or for the liquidation of a life insurance
policy, where there are typically notice periods and/or penalties to be paid if withdrawal happens before a
certain horizon. Hence, agents in the model with a greater likelihood of needing to consume in the middle
period can be interpreted as investors who face a greater risk of having to sell a portion of their portfolio to
meet larger than usual withdrawal of funds.
3 Derivation of the Portfolio Problem
I focus my attention on symmetric equilibria where all agents of the same type make the same decisions. I
derive the first-order conditions characterizing the optimal portfolio choice of agents at date 0 by working
backwards.
3.1 Last Period (t = 2)
In the last period an agent consumes whatever she is entitled to given her portfolio, which means a producer
and a consumer respectively derive utility r! · x and U(r! · x) of entering the last period with portfolio
x ≡ (xϵ)ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax] in state !, where ” · ” indicates the dot product.
3.2 Middle Period (t = 1)
Moving on to the middle period, we have that the problem of a producer entering the middle period with
portfolio x when the state of the world is ! is
max
(h,d)
{− (A!)−1 h+ r! · (x+ d)},
subject to the budget constraint Q! ·d = h and the feasibility constraints h ≥ 0 and dϵ ≥ −xϵ for all ϵ, where
h is the e§ort, d ≡ (dϵ)ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax] the portfolio the producer receives as payment, andQ! ≡ (Q!ϵ )ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax]
the state-! vector of date-1 prices for claims. Since early consumers’ marginal utility goes to infinity as their
consumption in the middle period goes to zero, consumers bring non-empty portfolios into the middle period,
thereby ensuring that production takes place then. The constraint on e§ort is therefore non-binding. The
first-order condition with respect to the quantity of type-ϵ claims to accept in state !, d!ϵ , is thus
− (A!)−1Q!ϵ + r!ϵ ≤ 0,
with equality if d!ϵ > −xϵ. Denote the solution to a producer’s problem at t = 1 by (h0,!,d0,!).
The problem of an early consumer of type i entering the middle period with portfolio x in state ! is
V i,!(x) = max
(c,d)
{θ!u(c) + U [r! · (x− d)]},
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subject to the budget constraint c = Q! · d and the feasibility constraints c ≥ 0 and dϵ ≤ xϵ for all ϵ, where
c is consumption and d ≡ (dϵ)ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax] the portfolio the consumer transfers as payment to producers
at date t = 1. Assuming that the portfolio is non-empty one can replace c in the objective function by
its expression from the budget constraint and obtain that the first-order condition with respect to d!ϵ , the
quantity of type-ϵ claims sold in state !:
Q!ϵ θ
!u0(Q! · d) ≥ r!ϵ U 0(r! · (x− d)),
with equality if d!ϵ < xϵ. Denote the solution to the date-1 problem of a type-i consumer with portfolio x
by (ci,!(x),di,!(x)), i 2 {1, ...I}.
The market clearing conditions for this period in state ! when consumers of type i enter with portfolios
xi are:
Claims :
IX
i=1
µidi,!ϵ (x
i) = d0,!ϵ , for all ϵ, and
Goods :
IX
i=1
µici,!(xi) = h0,!.
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In a symmetric equilibrium the date-1 price of a type-ϵ claim in state ! 2 {1, 2} is
Q!ϵ = A
!r!ϵ . (2)
Furthermore, the marginal value at t = 1 of claims of type ϵ for an early consumer of type i 2 {1, ..., I} is
given by
V i,!ϵ (x) = r
!
ϵ ×A!θ!u0(A!r! · di,!(x)),
where di,!(x) solves
A!θ!u0 (A!r! · d!(x)) = U 0(r! · (x− d!(x))). (3)
Let v0(x) and vi(x) be the values of entering the middle period with portfolio x, before consumers know
whether they want to consume and therefore before the state of the world is revealed, for a producer and
a consumer of type i respectively. It follows from the above lemma and the envelope condition that the
marginal value of entering the middle period with portfolio x is
v0ϵ (x) = 1,
for producers, and that for a consumer of type i 2 {1, ..., I} it is
viϵ(x) =
X
!2{h,l}
π!
#
r!ϵ U
0(r! · x)×
$
1 + σi
%
A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(x)))
U 0(r! · x) − 1
&'(
. (4)
A couple of remarks are in order. First, the price of the risk-free asset in the middle period varies with
the state if A does, thereby implying that the ϵ = 0 claims are therefore really risk-free if and only if A is
constant or the claims are held until maturity.
Moreover, since consumers are indi§erent between the di§erent types of claims as media of exchange,
I will, in order to simplify the presentation, assume that when agents trade claims consumers transfer the
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same fraction of each type of claim, so that d!(x) = α!(x)x for α!(x) 2 [0, 1]. Even though this assumption
can be restrictive for a given agent, it is much less so at the aggregate. In fact, this assumption is equivalent
to assuming that agents randomize between the di§erent claims and that a law of large numbers exists and
ensures that this is correct at the aggregate.10
Finally, the setup does not allow late consumers to sell claims early, for there are no other means than
claims to transfer resources between the middle and final periods. I show in section 2 of the online appendix
that introducing a storage technology between the last two periods to enable late consumers to sell early
their portfolio whenever the terms of trade are favorable does not change the results.
3.3 First Period (t = 0)
The problem of a producer endowed at date t = 0 with a portfolio k of claims to trees is
max
(c,h,x)
{c− h+ v0(x)},
subject to the budget constraint c+ q · x = h+ q · k and the feasibility constraints c, h ≥ 0, and xϵ ≥ 0 for
all ϵ, where q ≡ (qϵ)ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax] is the vector for the price of claims at date t = 0. Substituting the budget
constraint into the objective function, we obtain that the first-order condition with respect to the choice of
type-ϵ claims is
−qϵ + 1 ≤ 0, = if xϵ > 0.
Similarly, the maximization problem of a consumer of type i who is endowed at date t = 0 with a portfolio
k of claims to trees is
max
(c,h,x)
{c− h+ vi(x),
subject to the budget constraint c + q · x = h + q · k and the feasibility constraints c, h ≥ 0, and xϵ ≥ 0
for all ϵ. Substituting again the budget constraint into the objective function, we obtain that the optimal
portfolio choice of a consumer of type i is such that for all ϵ
−q(ϵ) + viϵ(x) ≤ 0, = if xϵ > 0. (5)
Denoting the demand for claims to trees of type ϵ by type-i agents by xiϵ, so that x
i =
)
xiϵ
*
ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax],
we have that the date-0 market clearing conditions imply11 that for all ϵZ ϵ
ϵmin
IX
i=0
µixiϵ0dϵ
0 = K
Z ϵ
ϵmin
dG (ϵ0) . (6)
The left-hand side is the demand of claims with a level of risk no more than ϵ, while the right-hand side is
the supply of such claims.
Definition 1 A symmetric equilibrium is a list
,
q,
)
xi
*I
i=0
-
such that (5) and (6) hold.
In order to simplify the presentation of the analysis I will be making the following additional assumption.
Assumption 1: U 0(rh · k) ≥ 1.
10This matters for the predictions of the model regarding the velocity of the di§erent claims.
11The expressions implicitly assume that for all types of agents i, their portfolio is such that xi is integrable with
respect to ϵ. This is without much loss of generality.
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This is a technical assumption, which ensures that only consumers choose to hold onto claims when
leaving the first period, because they always have a marginal value of claims which is greater than that of
producers. If I do not make this assumption, it can be that producers leave period 0 with some claims (at
one end of the risk-spectrum), and when this happens the price of these claims must be 1.
4 The Formation of Asset Classes
4.1 Some Preliminaries on Liquidity
Liquidity Services and Liquidity Premium - It follows from (4) that the marginal valuation of a type-ϵ
claim for a type-i agent can be decomposed into two components. The first,
villiqϵ (x
i) ≡
X
!2{h,l}
π!r!ϵ U
0(r! · xi) (7)
is the marginal value that the agent places on an illiquid claim, that is, a claim which cannot be traded
in the middle period. This component does not depend directly on the agent’s type, but it does indirectly
depend on it through her portfolio choice. The second component is
vliq,iϵ (x
i) ≡ σi
X
!2{h,l}
π!r!ϵ l
!(xi), (8)
where
l!(xi) ≡ .A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(xi)))− U 0(r! · xi)/ ≥ 0.
vliq,iϵ (x
i) is the expected marginal surplus the agent obtains in the middle period (over holding onto the claim
until the last period) from the ownership of this type of claim. This expected marginal surplus captures the
value of the liquidity services that this type of claim provides to this type of agents.
Combining this with (5), we have that the price of a type-ϵ claim tree is given by
qϵ = max
i
0
villiqϵ (x
i) + vliq,iϵ (x
i)
1
. (9)
Hence, the price of a claim is determined by the types of agents with the greatest willingness to pay, as
in Walrasian consumption-based asset pricing models with endogenous funding liquidity constraints, e.g.,
Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Chen and Lustig (2010), or Geanakoplos and Zame (2014). Note, and this will
be important soon, that there might be more than one type of agents holding onto a given type of claims.
Moreover, very much like in liquidity-based asset pricing models of Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) or Lagos
(2010), among others, the price of a claim can be decomposed into the price of an illiquid claim and a (price)
liquidity premium. The two components of the price of a claim are not independent of each other, for they
are jointly determined by the type(s) of agents holding this type of claims and by the portfolio choice of
these agents. Moreover, there can be more than one decomposition of the price of a claim between the price
of an illiquid claim and the liquidity premium, because there could be more than one type of agents valuing
the claim the same way, but with di§erent values for an illiquid claim and for liquidity services. These two
points will be reinforced when I derive CAPM-like formulae that decompose the rate of return of a claim
into risk and liquidity premia.
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There is a special case for which the expression of the price of a claim becomes particularly simple, and
which highlights the role of liquidity services in determining the price of a claim. If we assume that last
period utility is linear in consumption with U(c) = c, we have that (i) the value of all illiquid claims is 1
for all types of agents, and (ii) the expression for the liquidity services a consumer of type i receives from a
type-ϵ claim simplifies to
vliq,iϵ = σ
i
X
!2{h,l}
π!r!ϵ
.
A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(xi))− 1/ ≥ 0.
In this case the price of claim of type ϵ is simply given by
qϵ = 1 + `ϵ ≥ 1,
with `ϵ = maxi vliq,iϵ (x
i). That is, di§erences in prices across claims come exclusively from di§erences in
the value of liquidity services and claims are priced by the types of agents who receives the highest liquidity
services from these claims. This is because in this case di§erences in portfolios do not lead to di§erences in
the valuation of the associated illiquid claim, and it implies that there is a unique liquidity premium for a
given type of claims.
Decomposition of Risk and Liquidity Services - It appears from expression (8) that the liquidity
services that a type of claims provide to a given type of agents can itself be decomposed into two parts. In
fact, given (1) and (8), we have that
vliq,iϵ (x
i) = σi
.
Γliq(xi)− ϵπ∆liq(xi)/ .
The first component of the liquidity services provided to an agent of type i is σiΓliq(xi), where
Γliq(xi) ≡
X
!2{h,l}
π!l!(xi),
and is independent of ϵ. It corresponds to the liquidity services that a risk-free asset provides. The second
component, −σiϵπ∆liq(xi), depends on
∆liq(xi) ≡
,
Alθlu0(Alrl · dl(xi))− U 0(rl · xi)
-
−
,
Ahθhu0(Ahrh · dh(xi))− U 0(rh · xi)
-
, (10)
and is a risk adjustment for the liquidity services provided by a type-ϵ claim to agents of type i, with a higher
∆ indicating a greater adjustment for risk. ∆liq captures how much more this type of consumers want to
consume early rather than late, in state l relative to state h.
Similarly, the marginal valuation of an illiquid claim for a type-i agent can itself be decomposed into two
parts:
villiqϵ (x
i) = Γrisk(xi)− ϵπ∆risk(xi),
where
Γrisk(xi) ≡
X
!2{h,l}
π!U 0(r! · xi), and
∆risk(xi) ≡ U 0(rl · xi)− U 0(rh · xi). (11)
The first term is the marginal valuation of an illiquid risk-free asset, while the second-term is the risk-
adjustment for an illiquid asset, adjustment which again depends on how much more a consumer wants to
consume in state l than in state h at maturity.
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Putting things together, we have that the marginal valuation of an asset can be rewritten as a linear
function of its level of risk ϵ,
viϵ(x
i) = Γi(xi)− ϵπ∆i(xi), (12)
where Γi ≡ Γrisk + σiΓliq and ∆i ≡ ∆risk + σi∆liq. This representation of the marginal valuation of claims
makes clear that in the absence of di§erentiated liquidity needs, all consumers would value assets the same
way, and thus di§erences in valuations across consumer types are driven exclusively by di§erences in liquidity
needs. In the special case where U(c) = c, we have that Γrisk = 1 and ∆risk = 0, so that
viϵ(x
i) = 1 + σi
.
Γliq(xi)− ϵπ∆liq(xi)/ .
4.2 Equilibrium Class Structure and First Implications for Asset Prices
Asset Classes - The previous section established that the value that an agent attaches to a claim changes
linearly with the risk of the claim. This property leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium is such that the sets of claims and agent types can each be partitioned into
a sequence of K ≤ I groups {Ξk, Ik}Kk=1 such that:
(i) Ξk = [ϵ∗k−1, ϵ
∗
k], where ϵ
∗
0 = ϵmin, ϵ
∗
K = ϵmax, and ϵ
∗
k−1 < ϵ
∗
k for all k;
(ii) Ik ⊆ {1, ..., I}, with Ik \ Im = {?} for all k 6= m, and agents with type i 2 Ik only hold onto claims
with risk ϵ 2 Ξk.
(iii) ∆i > ∆j for any two types in Ik and j 2 Im with k < m.
Parts (i) and (ii) are about the existence of a class structure. The set of types of agents can be partitioned
in K ≤ I subsets, or classes, and all types belonging to a given class hold onto the same types of claims
whose risk belong to a given interval. And the spectrum of risk for claims can itself be split into K ≤ I
intervals that do not overlap, except at boundaries, these are the asset classes, such that claims in a certain
asset class are held only by agents of a certain class. Part (iii) says that agents whose valuation of claims
is the most sensitive to risk, those with the largest ∆, hold the safest assets, and vice versa. In particular,
if U(c) = c, so that ∆risk = 0 for all agents, the agents with the largest ∆ are the agents whose value of
liquidity services is the most sensitive to risk.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Asset Pricing Function - The model has clean predictions for how asset prices depend on the risk of
an asset. In fact, if there is a unique class, then all types of agents have the same marginal valuation of
assets for all levels of risk ϵ, and all types of agents also have the same sensitivity to risk ∆. In this case the
impact of risk on asset prices is simply
@q (ϵ)
@ϵ
= −π∆.
Hence, we obtain that prices are a linear function of the risk index ϵ.
If, however, there are several classes in equilibrium, then we obtain that the asset price function is
piecewise linear and convex in ϵ. In fact, if there are K > 1 classes, then we have that ∆i(xi) > ∆j(xj) >
... > ∆n(xn) for i 2 I1, j 2 I2, and n 2 IK and prices for claims held by agents of class k change with risk
according to
@q (ϵ)
@ϵ
= −π∆i(xi),
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for i 2 Ik. If ∆ > 0 for all types, then the price of safer assets is more sensitive to risk than the price of
riskier assets. I will later on establish that it is possible to have ∆ < 0 for some types, thereby implying
that the price of claims held by these agents is increasing in risk. This can happen if the terms of trade or
the liquidity e§ects lead (some) consumers to want to consume more in state h than in state l, because then
the marginal value of of a claim increases with risk.
Simple and Complex Securities - When all types of agents belong to the same class it is possible
to use simple securities like Arrow securities to price the claims that agents trade in this paper, which are
complex securities. However, this is no longer true when there is more than one class.
Let p! denote the price of an Arrow security that delivers one unit of the general good at t = 2 when
the state of the world is !. We then have that for all ϵ and all i,
p! = max
i
π!
#
U 0(r! · xi)×
$
1 + σi
%
A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(xi)))
U 0(r! · xi) − 1
&'(
.
It follows that when there is a unique class the cost of obtaining in the last period 1+ ϵ units of the good in
the h state and 1− (π/(1− π))ϵ in the l state is
(1 + ϵ) ph +
%
1− π
1− π ϵ
&
pl = qϵ. (13)
However, when there is more than one class, then (13) typically does not always hold. In fact, if we use
Arrow securities to build a risk-free asset, its price is
ph + pl = πmax
i
(
U 0(rh · xi)×
"
1 + σi
 
Ahθhu0(Ahrh · dh(xi)))
U 0(rh · xi) − 1
!#)
+(1− π)max
i
(
U 0(rl · xi)×
"
1 + σi
 
Alθlu0(Alrl · dl(xi)))
U 0(rl · xi) − 1
!#)
,
whereas the price of a risk-free claim in this paper is
q0 = max
i
X
!2{h,l}
π!
#
U 0(r! · xi)×
$
1 + σi
%
A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(xi)))
U 0(r! · xi) − 1
&'(
,
and thus q0 ≤ ph + pl and therefore q0 < ph + pl whenever there is more than one class. Note that this
is di§erent from Alvarez and Jermann (2000) who, in their consumption-based asset pricing model with
endogenous funding liquidity constraints that are not too tight, obtain that the price of a complex security
is equal to the price of a set of simple securities replicating that complex security. In fact, there would
otherwise be an arbitrage possibility by purchasing a complex security whose price is lower than the price of
a set of simple securities replicating it, stripping it into Arrow securities, and reselling the Arrow securities.
I allow for neither short-selling nor stripping and repackaging of securities, thereby implying that agents
cannot take advantage of such arbitrage possibilities in my framework.
5 Liquidity-Need Adjusted CAPM
I have so far focused on the valuation that agents attach to claims and the implications for the pricing of such
claims. In this section I instead consider the rate of return of claims and show that it is possible, very much
like in Holmström and Tirole (2001) or Acharya and Pedersen (2005), AP hereafter, to derive CAPM-like
formulae where liquidity concerns are added. The proofs of the results in this section can be found in the
online appendix.
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5.1 Risk and Liquidity Premia Decomposition
Let R!ϵ denote the gross rate of return on a type-ϵ claim in state !, i.e., R
!
ϵ ≡ r!ϵ /qϵ. Assuming that risk-free
claims belong to class k, i.e., 0 2 Ξk, we have that Rilliq,ik0 , the rate of return that a type ik agent belonging
to class k demands for an illiquid risk-free claim, is
Rilliq,ik0 =
1
E [U 0(r · xik)] . (14)
Clearly, we have that E
.
U 0(r · xi)/ = 1 for any type i whenever U(c) = c, in which case Rilliq,i0 = 1 for all i.
Let further φkm be the ratio of the marginal values of a risk-free claim for any two types of agents ik 2 Ik
and im 2 Im, i.e.,
φkm ≡ E
.
U 0(r · xik) + σik l(xik)/
E [U 0(r · xim) + σim l(xim)] . (15)
It is important to note that φkm is indexed by the classes k and m that the agents belong to, but not by
the specific types of agents. This is because all agents belonging to the same class have the same marginal
valuation of risk-free claims, even though the decomposition between the values of an illiquid claim and the
value of liquidity services is di§erent across types in the same class.
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume that risk-free claims belong to class k, i.e., 0 2 Ξk.
(i) The rate of return on a risk-free claim can be expressed as
R0 = R
illiq,ik
0 −Rilliq,ik0
Rilliq,ik0 E
.
σik l(xik)
/
1 +Rilliq,ik0 E [σik l(xik)]
(16)
for any ik 2 Ik.
(ii) The excess returns on claims of type ϵ 2 Ξm can be expressed as
E [Rϵ]−R0 = (φkm − 1)R0
−φkm ×R0cov
)
Rϵ, U
0(r · xim)* (17)
−φkm ×R0cov
)
Rϵ,σ
im l(xim)
*
for im 2, Im with φkm > 1 and increasing in m whenever 0 2 Ξ1 or K ≥ 3.
(i) gives a formula to obtain the rate of return on a liquid risk-free claim given the rate of return of
the illiquid risk-free claim. Not surprisingly, a risk-free liquid claim commands a lower rate of return than
a perfectly illiquid risk-free claim, because of the liquidity services a liquid claim provides. And there are
as many decompositions for a given type of claims as there are types of agents holding this type of claims,
because di§erent types of agents value liquidity services di§erently.
From (ii) it appears the model admits an additive representation, very much like the traditional CAPM,
but where a liquidity premium, −φkm ×R0cov
)
Rϵ,σ
im l(xim)
*
, and an absolute excess return (φkm − 1)R0
are added to the traditional risk-premium, −φkm × R0cov
)
Rϵ, U
0(r · xim)*. If a risky claim belongs to the
same class as the risk-free claim, so that ik and im belong to the same class and φ
km = 1, then there are
no absolute excess returns. The liquidity premium is an adjustment to the risk-free rate of a liquid claim
to take into account the covariance between returns at maturity and the liquidity services provided by the
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claims. The risk premium can be decomposed further. In fact, we can use the usual CAPM expression to
express the expected returns on an illiquid type-ϵ claim:
E[Rilliq,ikϵ ] = R
illiq,ik
0 −Rilliq,ik0 cov(Rilliq,ikϵ , U 0(r · xik)).
The risk premium is thus made up of −Rilliq,ik0 cov(Rilliq,ikϵ , U 0(r · xik)), the standard risk premium for an
illiquid type-ϵ claim, and −[R0 × cov
)
Rϵ, U
0(r · xj)* − Rilliq,ik0 cov(Rilliq,ikϵ , U 0(r · xik))], an adjustment for
the di§erence in hedging properties at maturity between liquid and illiquid claims of type-ϵ.
As has been mentioned earlier, even though the model admits an additive representation, the risk and
liquidity premia have to be computed jointly, because U 0(r · xi) and σil(xi) are not independent of each
other. Furthermore, the variations of the terms of trade and urgency of liquidity needs can exacerbate or
dampen the impact of risk, for, as I will soon establish, they can lead l(x) to move in the same or opposite
direction to U 0(r · x).
Finally, when there is more than once class, the model generates absolute excess returns, or "alphas," for
claims that do not belong to the same class as the risk-free claims, and depending on whether φkm is greater
than 1 or not it plays the role of an amplificating or dampening role on the role for the covariances for the
risk and liquidity premia. Since φkm > 1 whenever 0 2 Ξ1 or K ≥ 3, the model is able to generate a positive
absolute excess returns for claims at the top end of the risk spectrum.
5.2 Excess Returns and the Market Portfolio
I now show how the excess returns on a given type of claims can be expressed as a function of the excess
returns of the market portfolio. The starting point is the price of the market portfolio. If we denote by qM
the price of the market portfolio, i.e., qM ≡ R ϵ
ϵ
qϵdF (ϵ),12 we have that
qM =
KX
k=1
Z ϵk
ϵk
E
.
rϵ
)
U 0(r · xik) + σik l(xik)*/ dF (ϵ),
for type ik belonging to class k. Since the pricing function is convex we have that qM ≥ q", with strict
inequality if there are two or more classes. Defining RM,! as the gross return of the market portfolio in state
!, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The excess returns for claims of type ϵ 2 Ξn can be expressed as
E [Rϵ]−R0 = αϵ + βϵ{E[RM ]−R0}, (18)
where for 0 2 Ξk, " 2 Ξm, and in 2 In and im 2 Im there exists ξ > 0 such that
βϵ ≡
φkn
φkm
cov
)
Rϵ, U
0(r · xin) + σin l(xin)*
cov (R", U 0(r · xim) + σim l(xim)) , and
αϵ ≡ (φkn − 1)− (φkm − 1) φ
kn
φkm
cov
)
Rϵ, U
0(r · xin) + σin l(xin)*
cov (R", U 0(r · xim) + σim l(xim))R0 + βϵξ.
Furthermore, if there exists a unique class, then αϵ = 0; otherwise, if m = k and the asset pricing function
is strictly decreasing everywhere, then the absolute excess return αϵ > 0 for ϵ 2 Ξn when n > m = k.
12Since the asset pricing function is in general not linear, the price of the market portfolio cannot simply be obtained
by the price of type-" claims and has to be computed directly
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This proposition establishes that if there exists a unique class, then the standard beta-pricing formulae
applies, except that marginal utility needs to be augmented with the liquidity needs. If, however, there is
more than one class, then absolute excess returns appear and the "beta" needs to be adjusted to take into
account di§erences in valuations of the risk-free claims. And one can also show that if the asset pricing is
strictly decreasing everywhere and risk-free claims belong to the same class as claims with same risk as the
market portfolio, then this absolute excess return is positive at the top end of the risk spectrum.
Expression (18) is not unlike expression (7) giving the conditional expected net returns of a security in
the model with random trading costs of AP. In fact, they obtain an expression for an asset’s excess returns
where the "beta" takes into account the variability in trading costs in addition to the variability in gross
returns, very much like (18) takes into account the variability of the liquidity services in addition to the
variability of the marginal utility at maturity. A notable di§erence between the two approaches is that AP
take the variability in trading costs as a primitive, whereas the variability in liquidity services is endogenous
in my framework. This is going to be of importance when I discuss the prediction of the model for velocity
or volume of trade and the implications regarding to use of such variables as proxies for cost of trade.
6 Equilibrium Sorting
In order to be able to provide a more detailed characterization of the equilibrium, and in particular of the
types of sorting that are possible, I now make two additional assumptions. Firstly, I assume that there are
two types of agents. Although this assumption is not necessary for all the results that follow,13 it simplifies
the analysis, for there can then be only three types of equilibria. In the first type, which I call Non-Segmented
Equilibria (NSE), type 1 and type 2 agents belong to the same class, whereas in the second and third types
of equilibria, which I call Segmented Equilibria (SE), the two types of agents belong to di§erent classes. In
one type of SE high-liquidity need agents holding onto the safer claims, while in the other type of SE it is
the agents with the low liquidity needs that hold onto the safer claims.
Second, I make the following assumption regarding the utility of consuming early and late for consumers:
Assumption 2: u(c) = U(c) = (c1−γ − 1)/(1− γ), for γ > 0.
This assumption ensures that the intensity of liquidity needs, that is how large the marginal utility of
early consumption of an early consumer is relative to that of a late consumer, is driven exclusively by the
parameter θ.14
Lemma 1 characterized half of the terms of trade by establishing that the price at which a type-ϵ claim
is sold in state ! is Q!ϵ = A
!r!ϵ . The next lemma characterizes the fraction of her portfolio that an agent
spends in the middle period.
Lemma 2 Assume that Assumption 2 holds. Then the fraction of her portfolio that an agent spends in state
!, ! 2 {h, l}, is given by
α! =
1
1 + (A!)1−
1
γ (θ!)−
1
γ
.
13 In particular, all the results about Non-Segmented Equilibria hold with an arbitrary number of types.
14 In a previous version of the paper (Jacquet, 2016) I considered a case where the intensity of liquidity need is
in-built, by assuming that (i) late consumers are risk-neutral and U(c) = c, and (ii) the utility function of early
consumers u(c) is of the either Constant Relative Risk Aversion or quadratic type. In that case the intensity of
liquidity needs is in equilibrium always greater in state l than in state h.
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Hence, we obtain that the fraction of her portfolio that an agent spends in the middle period is always
increasing with the urgency of the liquidity needs as measured by θ. The impact of price, which I call the
Terms of Trade e§ect and originates from the variation in the disutility of production for producers, depends
on the willingness to smooth consumption, as measured by γ: if the willingness to smooth is high, i.e., γ > 1,
it implies that a decrease in the cost of production of producers, which imply a fall in the selling price of
claims, leads to an increase in the fraction of the portfolio being sold or consumption in this middle period,
and vice versa. Note that when γ = 1 the terms of trade do not matter for the choice of the fraction of
portfolio sold.
It follows from lemma 2 that (12), the linear expression for the marginal valuation of a claim in period
1, can be re-expressed as
viϵ(x
i) =
X
!
π!eσi,!U 0(r! · xi)− ϵπ(eσi,lU 0(rl · xi)− eσi,hU 0(rh · xi)), (19)
where eσi,! ≡ 1 + σi[(1− α!)−γ − 1].
The following lemma is going to be useful.15
Lemma 3 Consider two types i and j such that σi > σj. Then, eσi,leσj,h ≥ eσi,heσi,l if and only if αl ≥ αh,
with strict inequality if αl > αh.
6.1 Portfolios as Mutual Funds
Before moving on to a more complete characterization of the equilibrium of the model it is useful to transform
the portfolio problem of agents into choices of mutual funds characterized by their size and average risk.
Some Notation and Definitions16 - If we define by Xi and E i the size and average risk of the portfolio
of an agent of type i, i.e.,
Xi ≡
Z
xi (ϵ) dϵ, and E i ≡ 1
Xi
Z
ϵxi (ϵ) dϵ, (20)
then we have that value of the portfolio of this type of agent in the last period when the state of the world
is ! is
r! · xi = (1 + E i,!)Xi,
where
1 + E i,h ≡ 1 + E i and 1 + E i,l ≡ 1− π
1− πE
i.
Since with two types of agents x2 (ϵ) =
)
Kg (ϵ)− µ1x1 (ϵ)* /(1 − µ1), we can easily express the size and
average risk of the portfolio of type 2 agents as a function of the characteristics of the portfolio of type 1
agents. In fact, we have that with two types of agents
X2 =
K − µ1X1
1− µ1 and E
2 =
KE − µ1X1E1
K − µ1X1 . (21)
It is worth noting for future reference that for a given size of portfolio X1, there is an admissible range of
values for the average risk of the portfolio E1 (for a given distribution of risk G and the size of the asset pool
15The proof requires only simple algebraic manipulations and is thus left to the reader.
16 In the following text the expressions implicitly assume that the portfolios of agents are such that the function
xi(ϵ) is integrable. This is without much loss of generality.
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K). I denote respectively by E imin(X1) and E imax(X1) the minimum and maximum admissible values of the
average risk for agents of type 1 given the size of the portfolio of agents of type 1 is X1 (again, this is given
K and the aggregate cdf of risk G).17 These restrictions implicitly incorporate the adding-up constraint that
the portfolio sizes must also satisfy,
P2
i=1 µ
iXi = K.
We now have all we need to be able to formally express the types of sorting that can take place in this
setup.
Definition 2 An equilibrium displays positive (no) [negative] sorting if it is such that E1 < (=)[>]E2.
Hence, an equilibrium with positive sorting is such that agents with greater liquidity needs hold portfolios
with lower average risk, which also means agents with higher liquidity needs hold onto portfolios that have
a lower covariance with the market portfolio than higher-liquidity-need agents do. This definition allows for
sorting even if there exists a unique class.
Definition 3 An equilibrium displays positive (negative) sorting with segmentation if it is such that ∆1(x1) <
(>)∆2(x2).
This stricter notion of positive sorting calls for the existence of two classes, in which case assets with
lower risk are held by agents whose valuation of claims is most sensitive to risk.
Portfolios and Alternative Equilibrium Definition - There might not be a unique portfolio xi that
solves the problem of an agent of type i. In fact, even if there is a unique couple (Xi, E i) solving the problem
of an agent of type i, there might be more than one portfolio leading to the couple (Xi, E i). If, for instance,
we consider a distribution of risk which is uniformly distributed, then there are a continuum of ways to
obtain a given (Xi, E i).18 In view of this it is useful to alternatively define a symmetric equilibrium with
two-types of agents as follows. First, let X1≡ .0,K/µ1/ and E1≡ .E1min (X) , E imax (X)/, i.e., X1 and E1 are
the set of feasible values for X1 and E1.
Definition 4 An equilibrium is a price system q = (q (ϵ))ϵ2[ϵmin,ϵmax] and
)
X1, E1* 2 X1 ×E1 such that for
all ϵ:
q (ϵ) = max
#
v1ϵ (X
1, E1); v2ϵ
%
K − µ1X1
1− µ1 ,
KE − µ1X1E1
K − µ1X1
&(
,
where for i 2 {1, 2}
xi (ϵ) = 0 if viϵ(X
i, E i) < max
j
vjϵ (X
j , Ej),
and X1 and E1 are then obtained from (20).
The advantage of this definition is that it focuses on whether any portfolio di§erences are material, i.e.,
whether they imply any di§erence in consumption.
17The expressions and some properties of these boundaries can be found in the online appendix.
18For instance, if agents of type i hold onto all assets with risk level in the intervals (Ei−η−0.5Xi(ϵmax−ϵmin), Ei−η)
and (Ei + η, Ei + η+ 0.5Xi(ϵmax − ϵmin)) for η ≥ 0, then type-i agents have portfolios of size Xi and average risk Ei,
irrespective of the exact value for η.
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6.2 Characterizing Sorting
We can use the mutual fund representation of portfolios to express (19) as
viϵ(x
i) =
X
!
π!eσi,!((1 + E1,!)X1)−γ − ϵπ[eσi,l((1 + E1,l)X1))−γ − eσi,h((1 + E1,h)X1)−γ ]. (22)
Non-Segmented Equilibria - In a NSE all agents have the same marginal value for all claims, thereby
implying that they have the same valuation of risk-free claims, i.e., Γ1(x1) = Γ2(x2), and the same sensibility
to risk, i.e., ∆1(x1) = ∆2(x2). Given (22), these two conditions are equivalent to
eσ1,!((1 + E1,!)X1))−γ = eσ2,!((1 + E2,!)X2))−γ for ! 2 {1, 2}. (23)
Since (X2, E2) can be expressed as functions of (X1, E1), solving for a NSE means solving for the system
of two equations (23) for the two unknowns (X1, E1).
Lemma 4 Assume Assumption 2 holds. If a NSE exists, then it is a unique and it is such that (i) X1 > X2,
and (ii) E1 < (=)[>]E2 if and only if (Al)1−γθl > (=)[<](Ah)1−γθh.
We thus obtain that if a NSE exists, then the portfolio profile is essentially unique, in that the size Xi and
average risk E i are uniquely determined, because there is a unique combination of size and average risk that
can deliver a given combination of average and variability of consumption. Hence, according to equilibrium
definition 4, if a NSE exists, then it is unique. Moreover, we have that agents with the greater liquidity needs
always hold onto larger portfolios, and whether sorting is positive or negative depends on how the terms of
trade and the intensity of liquidity needs vary across states. I discuss in greater details below why this is
the case.
Let me now provide some intuition about why a NSE does not always exist. The issue with the existence
of a NSE comes from the fact that the unique solution to the system of two equations (23) might be such that
the value of E1 falls outside [E1min(X1), E1max(X1)], the range of feasible portfolio levels of average risk given
the solution for X1. In fact, if the two types of agents have very similar liquidity risk, because σ1 is only
slightly greater than σ2, they hold very similar portfolios, in that their sizes and average risks do not di§er
very much. Thus, E1 solving (23) is slightly greater than E , which is slightly greater than E2, and, unless
the distribution of risk G is of an odd shape, it is possible to achieve these portfolio characteristics with
both types of agents holding onto all types of assets. But when the two types of agents have very di§erent
probability of facing liquidity needs in the DM, i.e., σ1 >> σ2, agents with the greater liquidity needs want
to hold onto a portfolio much larger and much safer than that of agents of type 2. So if the distribution of
risk G is such that agents of type 1 can hold onto a large and safe portfolio only if they hold onto all assets
with a level of risk below a certain threshold, then the equilibrium necessitates a segmentation of the asset
market.
Segmented Equilibria - There are two possible types of SE, one with positive sorting while the other
displays negative sorting. In the first type there exists a cuto§ ϵ∗ 2 (ϵmin, ϵmax) such that
v1ϵ (X
1, E1)
8>><>>:
>
=
<
v2ϵ
%
K − µ1X1
1− µ1 ,
EK − µ1E1X1
K − µ1X1
&
for ϵ
8>><>>:
<
=
>
ϵ∗,
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while in the second type the first set of inequalities are reversed. This also means that with positive sorting
the equilibrium value of E1 is given by E1min
)
X1
*
, while with negative sorting it is given by E1max
)
X1
*
.
Hence, in a SE with positive sorting an increase in the size of the portfolio of type 1 agents X1 implies an
increase in E1 (for Emin
)
X1
*
is increasing in X1), while in a SE with strict negative sorting an increase in
the size of the portfolio of type 1 agents X1 implies a decrease in E1 (for Emax
)
X1
*
is decreasing in X1).
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Assume Assumption 2 holds. If a SE exists, then it is unique and is such that (i) X1 > X2, and
(ii) E1 < [>]E2 if and only if (Al)1−γθl > [<](Ah)1−γθh.
Hence, just like for a NSE, if a SE exists, then it is unique according to definition 4, because there is a
unique solution (X1, E1). And agents with larger liquidity needs also always hold onto larger portfolios, and
whether sorting is positive or negative depends on the same condition as for a NSE. Again, I elaborate on
the condition for sorting below.
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium - We now know that when Assumption 2 is satisfied,
then at most one NSE exists and at most one SE exists. Moreover, in these two cases the same conditions
apply for the type of sorting. The following proposition establishes existence and uniqueness.
Proposition 4 Assume Assumption 2 holds. (i) An equilibrium exists and is unique, is such that X1 > X2,
and displays positive (no) [negative] sorting if and only if (Al)1−γθl > (=)[<](Ah)1−γθh.
(ii) Furthermore, let σ1 = σ + η and σ2 = σ − η, for η 2 (0,σ). Then, whenever (Al)1−γθl 6= (Ah)1−γθh
there exists η∗ 2 (0,σ) such that there is no segmentation in equilibrium for η < η∗, whereas segmentation
appears whenever η ≥ η∗.
Consider (i) and suppose that there is no aggregate risk, i.e., E = 0, Ah = Al, and θh = θl. In this case
there is no sorting, and therefore E1= E2. However, if E = 0 but the terms of trade and intensity of liquidity
need e§ects are such that (Al)1−γθl 6= (Ah)1−γθh, we know from the above results that there is sorting in
equilibrium, and therefore that either E1 < 0 < E2 or E1 > 0 > E2. That is, agents hold risky portfolios.
This is because, even though the market portfolio is riskless if held until maturity, the market portfolio is
risky for agents. In fact, agents face liquidity needs in the middle period and there is risk in this middle
period. (ii) is intuitive and was discussed earlier.
6.3 Understanding Sorting
Sources of Sorting - Let me now dig deeper into the sources of sorting. Agents can adjust their portfolios
along two dimensions, the size and the average risk, so it is not obvious a priori that any sorting should
take place in equilibrium. First note that the frequency of liquidity needs σ alone is not responsible for
the existence of sorting, as shows the fact that there is no sorting when eσ1,l/eσ1,h = eσ2,l/eσ2,h even though
σ1 > σ2. What matters is the interaction between the frequency of liquidity needs σ and the variability
of (A)1−γθ, which in equilibrium is the ratio of the marginal value of claims for an early consumer in the
middle period relative to that of a late consumer in the last period.
To see this, note that eσ1,l/eσ1,h > (=)[<]eσ2,l/eσ2,h if and only if (Al)1−γθl > (=)[<](Ah)1−γθh. It thus
appears that sorting is positive (negative) whenever the marginal value of claims for an early consumer in the
middle period relative to that of a late consumer in the last period is greater (smaller) in state l than in state
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h. This is because type-1 agents are the ones with the higher frequency of liquidity needs, thereby implying
that they are the agents most a§ected by the di§erences across states of the ratio of the marginal values of
claims, so that low-risk claims are relatively more valued by type-1 agents whenever (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh,
and vice versa whenever (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh. The relative size of portfolios for the two types then adjusts
to equalize the marginal values of claims whenever it is possible, that is whenever a NSE exists. In fact, the
equilibrium conditions (23) for a NSE can be rewritten as
1 + E1,l
1 + E1,h ×
1 + E2,h
1 + E2,l =
 eσ1,leσ1,h × eσ
2,h
eσ2,l
!γ
, and (24)
X1
X2
=
σ1
σ2
 eσ1,!/σ1eσ2,!/σ2
!1/γ
1 + E2,!
1 + E1,! , (25)
where
σi ≡
X
!
π!eσi,!.
(24) pins down the risk of the portfolio of type-1 agents relative to that of agents of type 2, while (25) pins
down the relative portfolio sizes given the relative risk of portfolios.19 If we assume that eσ1,l/eσ1,h = eσ2,l/eσ2,h,
then (24) implies that the relative risk of the two portfolios is 1, implying that E1 = E2 = E , which,
together with (25) implies that X1 = (σ1/σ2)1/γX2. This is clearly feasible, and therefore if the couple
(E1, X1) is feasible, then the unique equilibrium is a NSE where both types of agents choose portfolios that
replicate the market portfolio and type-1 agents hold onto larger portfolios than type-2 agents. If, however,eσ1,l/eσ1,h > eσ2,l/eσ2,h, then the right-hand side of (24) is strictly greater than 1, thereby implying that a NSE
must be such that E1 < E2, and therefore such that E1 < E < E2.
Let us now separate the e§ects of the intensity of liquidity needs, which are driven by θ, and of the terms
of trade, which are driven by A. In the absence of terms of trade e§ects, which happens when Ah = Al,
sorting is positive whenever the intensity of liquidity needs, as captured by θ, is stronger in state l than it is
in state h. This is intuitive: when the intensity of liquidity needs are stronger in state l than in state h, the
marginal utility of consumption of an early consumer relative to that of a late consumer is greater in state l
than in state h. I mentioned earlier that I obtained a similar result in a previous version of the paper with
no terms of trade e§ects and where the intensity of liquidity needs is in-built, because u(c) is of the CRRA
or quadratic types and U(c) = c. We can now see that in this case the ratio of marginal utilities is correlated
with the risk of the portfolio held by an agent, which is why the intensity of the liquidity needs is in-built
and always in one direction in this earlier version.
If we instead abstract from the e§ect of the intensity of liquidity needs and assume that θh = θl, we can
see that the impact of the terms of trades depends on the willingness of agents to substitute consumption
as measured by γ. If γ is below 1, and therefore the desire to smooth consumption is low, sorting is positive
whenever the terms of trade in the middle period relative to the last period are better in state l than in state
h - the ratio of the price of claims in state l in the middle period, Alrlϵ, relative to its price in the last period,
rlϵ,is low relative to the ratio of these two prices in state h whenever A
l is low relative to Ah. This terms of
trade e§ect is stronger for agents with a high frequency of liquidity needs, and therefore type-1 agents hold
portfolios that are safer than type-2 agents to su§er less from the terms of trade e§ects in state l. If γ = 1
19 (24) is not enough to pin down E1, because E2 depends on E1 and X1.
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the terms of trade have no impact, while the e§ects of the terms of trade are opposite if the agent has a
strong desire to smooth consumption because γ > 1.
Liquidity Needs as Preference Shocks - It follows from Assumption 2 that (12), the expression for
the marginal valuation of a claim in period 1, can be re-expressed as
viϵ(x
i) = σi
X
!
π!r!ϵ
 eσi,!
σi
!
[
)
1 + E i,!*Xi]−γ . (26)
The above expression shows that the model is equivalent to a standard consumption-based CAPM where
there is no middle period, and therefore no liquidity needs, but where agents di§er in they preferences
in two ways. First, they di§er in their absolute desire to consume through di§erences in σ. Second, the
di§erent types of agents face preference shocks (the eσ/σ) that are correlated across types but with type-
specific volatility. The model can therefore be interpreted as providing microfoundations for reduced-form
models with preference shocks (of a certain type), where the relative volatility of the preference shocks,
(eσ1,l/eσ1,h)/(eσ2,l/eσ2,h), is the driving force of the sorting between agents and claims.
7 Implications
I now move on to the implications of the equilibrium for the pricing of claims and the relationship between
prices and velocity, considering in turn the cases of no, positive, and negative sorting.
7.1 Asset Pricing Function
I first present the result and then discuss them.
No Sorting - We know from proposition (4) that an equilibrium displays no sorting if and only if
(Al)1−γθl = (Ah)1−γθh.
Lemma 6 Assume that Assumption 2 holds and that (Al)1−γθl = (Ah)1−γθh. If E = 0, then ∆1 = ∆2 = 0
and qϵ = Q for some Q > 0 for all ϵ. If instead E > 0, then ∆1 = ∆2 > 0, and qϵ is a strictly decreasing
linear function with slope −π∆1.
If there is no aggregate risk, because E = 0 and (Al)1−γθl = (Ah)1−γθh, then all claims fetch the
same price, whereas if the only aggregate risk is the risk of the market portfolio at maturity, i.e., E > 0
and(Al)1−γθl = (Ah)1−γθh, then the price of claims decreases linearly with risk.
Positive Sorting - We know from proposition (4) that an equilibrium displays positive sorting if and only
if (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh.
Lemma 7 Assume that Assumption 2 holds and that (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh. Then either the equilibrium
is a NSE and ∆1 = ∆2 > 0, in which case qϵ is a strictly decreasing linear function with slope −π∆1, or
the equilibrium is a SE with ∆1 > ∆2 > 0, in which case qϵ is a strictly decreasing piecewise linear function
with slope −π∆1 at first and then slope −π∆2.
The price of claims therefore always decreases with risk whenever (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh.
Negative Sorting - We know from proposition (4) that an equilibrium displays negative sorting if and
only if (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh.
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Lemma 8 Assume that Assumption 2 holds and that (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh. Then either the equilibrium
is a NSE such that ∆1 = ∆2 > (=)[<]0, in which case qϵ is a strictly decreasing (flat) [increasing] linear
function with slope −π∆1, or the equilibrium is a SE such that ∆2 > ∆1 ≥ 0, or ∆2 > 0 > ∆1, or
0 ≥ ∆2 > ∆1in which case qϵ is a strictly piecewise linear function with slope −π∆1 and −π∆2, which is
respectively strictly decreasing everywhere, decreasing and then increasing, or increasing everywhere.
We thus obtain that if (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh, then there is not always a clear relationship between the
price of claims and their risk, and in particular the price of claims can be increasing in risk at maturity over
some or all of the range. However, whatever the type of sorting taking place, there is a clear relationship in
the di§erence in di§erence: if we consider three types of claims with risk ϵ > ϵ0 > ϵ00, it is always true that
qϵ − qϵ0 ≥ qϵ0 − qϵ00 , with strict inequality if not all three types of claims belong to the same class.
Let me now provide some intuition for these results. In the absence of liquidity needs, the price of
claims would be independent of their risk when E = 0, or strictly decreasing with risk whenever E > 0.
This is intuitive: there would not be any aggregate risk in this case when E = 0, in which case agents can
insure themselves perfectly against variation in consumption across states by holding portfolios replicating
the market portfolio. And since then all claims would be the same at the margin, they would all fetch the
same price; whereas there would still be some aggregate risk when E > 0, and in this case agents would value
more claims with lower ϵ because they would have a lower covariance with the market portfolio.
This is still true when agents face liquidity needs, but the e§ects of the variation in the intensity of the
liquidity needs and of the terms of trade in the middle period can amplify, dampen, or even overturn the
impact of the risk of the portfolio at maturity. In fact, ignoring terms of trade e§ects for the time being, the
value for low-ϵ claims increases when θl > θh, because these claims also provide better payouts than higher ϵ
claims when the consumption needs are the greatest, whereas the opposite happens when θl < θh. Similarly,
if we abstract from variation in the intensity of liquidity needs and focus on the case where γ > 1, so that
the desire to smooth consumption is high, we have that the value of low ϵ claims increases relative to that of
higher ϵ claims when Al < Ah, because the payouts of claims in the middle period relative to the last period
are worse in state l than in state h, which leads agents to want to hold portfolios that provide relatively
better payouts in state l. And vice versa if Al > Ah. Hence, liquidity needs reinforce the attractiveness
of low-ϵ claims created by the presence of risk in the market portfolio (and creates it when E = 0) when
(Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh , it has no impact when (Al)1−γθl = (Ah)1−γθh, whereas it counteracts the market
portfolio risk whenever (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh. And in the latter case, if the amount of risk in the portfolio
at maturity E is small relative to the variation in (A)1−γθ, then higher-ϵ claims can become more expensive
than low-ϵ claims, because the e§ect of liquidity needs dominate the e§ect of risk at maturity. Note that
these liquidity e§ects are class specific, and therefore the sign of the covariance is constant within a class.
Let me now dig a bit deeper into the impact of the liquidity needs on how risk a§ects the price of claims.
Remember that the sensitivity of the risk-at-maturity and liquidity-need components of the value of a claim
for an agent of type i are respectively given by ∆i,risk and ∆i,liq as given in (11) and (10), which, given
Assumption 2, can respectively be re-expressed as
∆i,risk = ((1 + E i,l)Xi)−γ − ((1 + E i,h)Xi)−γ , and
∆i,liq = σi[
,
(Al)1−γθl − 1
-
((1 + E i,l)Xi)−γ −
,
(Ah)1−γθh − 1
-
((1 + E i,h)Xi)−γ ].
We can thus clearly see that if (Al)1−γθl = (Ah)1−γθh, then ∆i,liq = σi
)
(A)1−γθ − 1*∆i,risk and is propor-
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tional to ∆i,risk. In this case the covariance of the returns of a claim with the risk of the market portfolio
at maturity is what is driving the price of claims.
If instead (Al)1−γθl 6= (Ah)1−γθh, then the impact of risk at maturity and of liquidity needs can be
di§erent. For instance, one can find parameters such that E > 0, (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh so that in
equilibrium E2 > E1 > 0, which implies that ∆1,risk > 0 and ∆2,risk > 0. And, since (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh,
the equilibrium must also be such that ∆1,liq > 0 and ∆2,liq > 0. In this case the e§ects of risk and liquidity
needs reinforce each other. If, however, we consider the case where E = 0 and (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh, we
know from lemmata (4) and (5) that in equilibrium E1 < 0 < E2, which implies that ∆1,risk < 0 < ∆2,risk.
But we know that ∆1 > 0, so it must also be that ∆1,liq > 0. Hence, if the equilibrium is a SE, the price
of claims at the low end of risk index ϵ, which are held by type-1 agents, is pushed up by the sensitivity to
risk at maturity, whereas it is pushed down because of the sensitivity to liquidity needs. Note that it is the
terms of trade and intensity of liquidity e§ects that lead agents to value low-ϵ claims so much more than
high-ϵ claims and leads type-1 agents to hold a portfolio negatively correlated with the market portfolio.
7.2 Velocity and Clientele E§ect
I now investigate the relationships between risk, price, and velocity of claims, where the velocity of claims
with risk in a given interval is defined as being the volume of trade for these claims over the stock of such
claims. Formally, the velocity for claims with risk in an interval (ϵ0, ϵ00) is
V ELO(ϵ0, ϵ00) =
R ϵ00
ϵ0
P
i=1,2 σ
ixi(ϵ)dϵR ϵ00
ϵ0 k(ϵ)dϵ
,
which clearly increases as the fraction of claims with risk in (ϵ0, ϵ00) held by type-1 agents increases. Since all
types of agents sell all their claims in the middle period if they are early consumers whereas they hold on to
all of them if they are late consumers, di§erences in the velocity of trade across claims are driven exclusively
by di§erences in the frequency of liquidity needs.
As discussed earlier, portfolios might not be uniquely pinned down. This implies that the fraction
of claims of certain risk levels held by agents of a given type is not always pinned down, only the size
and average risk of their portfolios are, and thus the equilibrium velocity of claims might not be uniquely
pinned either. Interestingly, this means that di§erences in velocity of certain claims need not come from
the existence of sorting, or that changes over time in the velocity of claims might be due to changes in the
portfolio compositions not related to changes in the fundamentals of the economy. However, sorting creates
a correlation between risk and velocity when considering the entire set of claims: this correlation is negative
with positive sorting, while it is positive with negative sorting, and there is no correlation overall when
no sorting is observed. And we also obtain that there is no correlation between the price of a claim and
its velocity in the absence of sorting, whereas the correlation is negative with positive sorting, and can be
anything with negative sorting. Notice in particular that the correlation between price and velocity can be
positive with both positive and negative sorting.
Clientele e§ect - The di§erences in measured liquidity arise from a selection e§ect, which is known
in the literature as a clientele e§ect (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Pagano, 1989; and Studart, 2014).
The clientele e§ect appears in these papers because, similar to this framework, some agents have shorter
trading horizon than others, but, and this is in contrast to this paper, assets di§er in their cost of trade,
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which is meant to capture costs arising from transactions, like broker fees and bid-ask spread, or from search
and delays of trades. However, in this paper di§erences in velocity arise from risk di§erences across assets
and these do not have any direct relationship with the ease of trade or any other determinant of intrinsic
liquidity.
The distinction between the two sources of di§erences in velocity matters and highlights that the di§erence
between measured and intrinsic liquidity is subtle but important. In fact, if di§erences of velocity across
assets arise from di§erences in risk, then di§erences in measured liquidity need not imply di§erences in
intrinsic liquidity. Hence, if one considers some assets with a low velocity of trade, this could be because
of the existence of significant trading frictions, the result of a clientele e§ect not originating from intrinsic
liquidity di§erences, or a combination of both. If the low velocity is purely the consequence of a clientele
e§ect originating in risk di§erences, then: (i) it would not be possible to increase the measured liquidity of
this asset market without changing the intrinsic characteristics of this type of assets, which might not be
feasible or even desirable since it means reducing the risk of these assets; (ii) changes in velocity observed
for some assets can, through changes in the types of agents who hold them, be the natural consequence of
changes in the perceived risk of these assets, and, in particular, sudden drops in measured liquidity observed
in times of so-called market freezes need not have anything to do with disruptions to the functioning of a
market. I will discuss this point in greater detail in the next section.
The fact that intrinsic di§erences in liquidity need not be the sole driver of di§erences in velocity or
volume of trade means that it can be problematic to use liquidity measures that rely on velocity or trading
volume of an asset as a proxy for its intrinsic liquidity properties. For instance, consider the following
measure of illiquidity for some asset i in month t proposed by Amihud (2002) and used by AP,
ILLIQiy ≡ 1
Diy
DiyX
t=1
|Riyd|
V OLDivyd
,
where Riyd and V OLDivyd are respectively the return and dollar volume on day d of year y, and Diy is
the number of days for which data are available for asset i in year y. Assume the model predicts there are
two classes, because σ1 is significantly larger than σ2. Then, claims in the first class have a much greater
velocity that assets in the second class. Consider two assets with similar risk parameters ϵ = ϵ∗ − η and
ϵ0 = ϵ∗ + η, for η small and where ϵ∗ is the cuto§ between the two classes. These two types of claims must
have similar average daily returns, for the asset pricing function is continuous. But since they have very
di§erent velocities of trade, we would have that ILLIQϵ is significantly lower than ILLIQϵ0 , which would
be interpreted as implying that type-ϵ are a lot more liquid than the ones of type-ϵ0 even though they are
intrinsically equally liquid. Even if we introduce shocks (please see the next section and the online appendix)
that lead to changes in the cuto§ ϵ∗ and to shifts in the asset pricing function, because the asset pricing
function is continuous in risk while velocity is not, claims with not too di§erent risk levels still have not too
di§erent average daily returns while they can have quite di§erent average velocity.
Note also that another di§erence between the risk-based source of di§erences in liquidity put forward
in this paper and the cost-based explanation found in AM is that the risk-based explanation requires het-
erogeneity of agents’ liquidity needs to generate di§erences in the velocity of trade of assets, whereas the
cost-based explanation does not. In fact, if we assume that all agents are alike, live for infinitely-many
periods, and face common liquidity needs, in the form of consumption needs, that arise randomly and with a
varying intensity over time, agents would trade low-cost assets more often that high-cost ones to save on the
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cost of trade: if consumption needs are low agents sell only assets with the lowest cost of trade, while when
consumption needs are larger agents also sell assets with larger cost of trade. In this sense the di§erences in
velocity obtained in the cost-based explanation are actually driven by di§erences in assets’ characteristics,
whereas the risk-based explanation put forward in this paper also requires heterogeneity in agents’ liquidity
needs.
7.3 Safe Assets and Flight-to-Safety
In this section I show that the model can be used to define what constitutes a safe asset as well as understand
phenomena known as "flight-to-safety," where investors’ demand for safe assets increases. In the interest of
brevity the analysis is carried out assuming that the equilibrium is a NSE. I refer the interested reader to
the online appendix for some complementary analysis.
The analysis was so far carried out assuming that the distribution of risk across claims has a given cdf G
and an associated level of aggregate risk E . Assume now that there is an increase in the individual risk of a
positive mass of claims, so that there is a new distribution of risk with cdf eG, which first-order stochastically
dominates G, and the new level of aggregate risk is eE > E . If we define qϵ(E) as being the price of a claim
with risk ϵ when the portfolio risk is E , we have the following proposition:20
Proposition 5 Assume that u satisfies Assumption 2 and that ϵ = (1− π)/π. Suppose that the equilibrium
is initially a NSE, that there is an increase in aggregate risk from E to eE, and that the new equilibrium is
still a NSE. Then:
(i) E1 and E2 both increase, ∆E1/∆E < (=)[>]∆E2/∆E when (Al)1−γθl > (=)[<](Ah)1−γθh, while X1(eE) =
X1(E) and X2(eE) = X2(E).
(ii) Furthermore, when (Al)1−γθl ≥ (Ah)1−γθh there exists a cuto§ bϵ 2 (0, (1− π) /π) such that qϵ(eE) > qϵ(E)
for all ϵ < bϵ, while qϵ(eE) ≥ qϵ(E) for all ϵ ≥ bϵ, with strict inequality for ϵ > bϵ.
Before going over the implications of this proposition for the impact on prices and measured liquidity of
such a change in the risk of the market portfolio, let me add that similar results are obtained when there
are changes to the intensity of liquidity needs and terms of trade in the middle period (see section 2.2 of the
online appendix).
Asset Price Changes and Safe Assets - Part (ii) of proposition 5 establishes that, following an
increase in the risk of the market portfolio, the asset pricing function rotates when there is no or positive
sorting. Note also that the price of claims whose risk increases can also increase, depending on (i) how their
initial risk compares with bϵ, (ii) the extent of the increase in their risk, and (iii) the extent of the change
in portfolio risk. In fact, ceteris paribus, an increase in the risk of an asset pushes its price down. But at
the same time, if the risk of the claim is and stays below the cuto§ bϵ, its price is, ceteris paribus, pushed up
by the increase in portfolio risk. But the larger its initial risk, the more unlikely it is that this asset’s price
increases, because the portfolio risk e§ect is stronger for riskier assets. And similarly, the larger the increase
in the individual risk of a claim, the less likely it is that the price of this asset increases.
The rotation of the asset pricing function and the fact that the price of low ϵ can increase even if their risk
increases highlights that in this set up safe assets are doubly safe, in that (i) their payo§s do not fluctuate
20Similar results hold when the changes are in the market conditions in the middle period. Please see part 2 of the
online appendix.
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much, or even are negatively correlated to aggregate risk, for a given level of risk and (ii) their payo§s
fluctuate in a counter-cyclical fashion with respect to the level of market risk. This can be useful when
thinking about risk and liquidity management.21
Let me know go over the intuition for the rotation of the asset pricing function. The price of a claim
is a weighted average of the marginal value that the consumers who hold this type of claims attach to
consumption in each state, and this marginal valuation in a given state is made up of the marginal utility
of consumption at maturity augmented by the gains from consumption in the middle period as an early
consumer. When the risk of the market portfolio increases, there are less resources available at maturity in
state l and more in state h, which leads to an increase in the marginal utility of consumption at maturity
for state l and a decrease for state h, and the magnitude of the impact is greater for state l than state h
because of the curvature of the utility function. Since the safer the claim, the larger the fraction of the
payout coming from state l, the more (less) their expected valuation is positively (negatively) a§ected by
the increase (decrease) in the marginal utility of consumption in the last period for state l (h). Whenever
(Al)1−γθl ≥ (Ah)1−γθh the combined e§ects of the terms of trade and of the intensity of liquidity needs in the
middle period reinforce the e§ect that the greater portfolio risk has on the marginal utility of consumption at
maturity. So that in this case the safest assets’ price goes up while the riskier claim see their price decrease.
When (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh, however, the combined e§ects of the terms of trade and of the intensity of
liquidity needs in the middle period go dampen the e§ect of the fall in consumption in state l relative to the
e§ect of the increase in consumption in state h at maturity, and if these e§ects are strong enough it can be
that the price of any claim goes down.
Velocity Changes and Flight-to-Safety - Proposition 5 also establishes that when the utility function
satisfies Assumption 2, then there is no change in the portfolio sizes, and the average risk of the portfolio
of agents with high liquidity needs increases, but by less than the market portfolio if there is no or positive
sorting. A consequence of these properties of the model is that, following an increase in portfolio risk, assets
with low risk are held, on average, in even greater proportion by agents with high liquidity needs if the initial
and new equilibria display positive sorting. And vice versa for assets at the right end of the distribution of
risk. This in turn implies that the velocity of safe assets increases on average, whereas the velocity of the
risky assets decreases on average, because of the clientele e§ect.
We thus obtain that an increase in the risk of the market portfolio can trigger a flight-to-safety, for the
price and velocity of the safer assets increases while they decrease for the riskier assets. Moreover, this also
shows that a flight-to-safety can be mistaken for a flight-to-liquidity, where investors wish to change the
composition of their portfolio towards more liquid assets. In fact, one could misinterpret the changes in
velocity of the di§erent types of assets arising from the clientele e§ect as indicating that there are changes
in the willingness to trade when in fact there is no change in the intrinsic liquidity properties of assets.
21For instance, the fact that safe and risky assets are respectively more expensive and cheaper when portfolio
risk increases means there are gains from arbitrage for an institution that does not have to worry about short-term
liquidity constraints. This suggests that asset purchase programs like the US Treasury’s TARP, the Federal Reserve’s
rounds of Quantitative Easing (QE), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the European Central Bank’s
extended Asset Purchase Programme (APP) are not bound to su§er from large losses (at least if assets are not
purchased and sold at prices well above and well below market prices).
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8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have presented a theory of endogenous liquidity di§erences across assets based on the inter-
action between di§erences in the risk of assets and di§erences in liquidity needs of investors. I have shown
that the equilibrium displays a class structure, and characterized the type of sorting observed in equilibrium,
as well as the implications for asset prices and velocity, a measure of liquidity. The model’s predictions on
sorting, and therefore on the relationship between risk, price, and velocity, depend crucially on the variability
of the terms of trade and the intensity of liquidity needs, which can vary over time. Hence, establishing
whether the data support the predictions of the model would require a detailed empirical analysis, which is
beyond the scope of the paper.
The existing literature is also of limited help in providing support for the theory in this paper, for most
of the literature interested in the role of liquidity in the pricing of assets uses measures of liquidity other
than velocity. However, there are exceptions, like Datar et al. (1998), Hu (1997), and Spiegel and Wang
(2005), and their results are consistent with the findings of this paper in the case of positive sorting. The
two former papers find a negative correlation between velocity and rates of return, while Spiegel and Wang
(2005) find that idiosyncratic risk and liquidity are highly correlated for stocks,22 and that after controlling
for idiosyncratic risk the explanatory power for stock returns of the liquidity measures they consider, which
include trading volume, mostly disappears.
The model is also able to match salient features of financial crises, like the 2007-8 subprime financial crisis
or the European sovereign debt crisis that followed, when one introduced an increase in risk, either in the
form of an increase in the risk of the market portfolio (section 7) or of an increase in the volatility of market
conditions (see section 2.2 of the online appendix). In particular, the model generates an increase in the
price and velocity of the safest assets, whereas the price and velocity of the riskiest assets drops, markedly
for assets whose risk increases.
The theory appears to provide a useful framework to think about policy issues, like the role of active
liquidity management in times of crisis. In particular, the response of the asset pricing function to a portfolio
risk shock or to changes in market conditions provides some rationale for outright asset purchase programs
like TARP, Quantitative Easing, or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM): an institution which is not
facing short-term funding constrains can take advantage of a dynamic arbitrage possibility by purchasing
risky (or selling safe) assets in times of high aggregate risk, and reselling these high risk (or purchasing back
these low risk) assets in times of low aggregate risk. And by doing so the institution reduces the level of
aggregate risk among assets in the market in times of high aggregate risk. A possible application of the
framework would be to investigate further the role that outright asset purchases by governments can play in
mitigating the e§ects of shocks, especially when also incorporating other considerations, like asymmetry of
information.
22 In the model a change in the level of portfolio risk triggers a rotation of the asset pricing function that, if we were
to assume a stable asset pricing function, would lead to interpret the data generated by the model as indicating that
low (high) ϵ claims are also assets with high (low) idiosyncratic risk.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) The first-order conditions to the problem of a producer are
− (A!)−1 + λ! + µ!h = 0,
and
r!ϵ − λ!Q!ϵ + eµ!ϵ = 0,
where λ!, µ!h , and eµ!ϵ are respectively the Lagrange mutlipliers on the budget constraint, non-negativity
constraint for h in state !, and the portfolio constraint for claim ϵ in state !. Since the marginal utility of
consumption of consumers in this period is infinity at zero consumption, they must consume, implying that
production takes place, and therefore that µ!h = 0 for ! = 1, 2. Hence, λ
! = (A!)
−1. It thus follows that
for all ϵ
Q!ϵ = A
!r!ϵ −A!eµ!ϵ . (A1)
Since limc!0 u0(c) = +1, we can ignore the non-negativity constraint for consumption in a consumer’s
problem, and obtain that the optimal choice of transfer in state ! for a consumer with porfolio x who wants
to consume, d!(x), is such that for all ϵ
Q!ϵ θ
!u0 (Q! · d!(x)) = r!ϵ U 0(r! · (x− d!(x))) + µ!ϵ , (A2)
where µ!(ϵ) is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint d!(ϵ) ≤ x(ϵ). From (A1) we have that for all ϵ
A!r!ϵ −A!eµ!ϵ = r!ϵ U 0(r! · (x− d!(x)))θ!u0 (Q! · d!(x)) + µ!ϵθ!u0 (Q! · d!(x)) .
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However, if eµ!ϵ > 0 for some ϵ, then there exist some agents for which µ!ϵ = 0, thereby implying that for
these agents
U 0(r! · (x− d!(x)))
θ!u0 (Q! · d!(x)) < A
!,
and therefore that eµ!ϵ > µ!ϵ for all ϵ for these agents. But this would imply that eµ!ϵ > 0 for all ϵ, which
cannot be true since this would imply early consumers do not consume in the middle period. Hence, it must
be that eµ!ϵ = 0 for all ϵ, i.e., producers never sell any claims in the middle period, and therefore
Q!ϵ = A
!r!ϵ . (A3)
(ii) It follows from the fact that producers never sell any claims in the middle period that whatever they
bring into the middle period is carried over to the last period. Furthermore, (A2) and (A3) together imply
that that for all agents
A!θ!u0 (A!r! · d!(x)) = U 0(r! · (x− d!(x))) + µ!ϵ /r!ϵ ,
implying that if µ!ϵ > 0 for some ϵ, then µ
!
ϵ > 0 for all ϵ, and that if µ
!
ϵ = 0 for some ϵ, then µ
!
ϵ = 0 for all
ϵ. That is, an agent is short of some types of claims in the middle period if and only if it is short of all other
types of claims, which also means all claims are equally good media of exchanges.
Since
V i,!ϵ (x) = r
!
ϵ ×A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(x))
@d!ϵ
@xϵ
+ U 0(r! · (x− d!(x)))×
%
1− @d
!
ϵ
@xϵ
&
,
it follows that if µ!ϵ = 0, then @d
!
ϵ /@xϵ 2 [0, 1), in which case
V i,!ϵ (x) = r
!
ϵ ×A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(x))
@d!ϵ
@xϵ
+A!θ!u0 (A!r! · d!(x))×
%
1− @d
!
ϵ
@xϵ
&
,
so that
V i,!ϵ (x) = r
!
ϵ ×A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(x)).
Whereas if µ!ϵ > 0, then @d
!
ϵ /@xϵ = 1, in which case
V i,!ϵ (x) = r
!
ϵ ×A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(x)).
This finishes the proof.!
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) The linearity in risk of agents’ valuation of claims implies that for any two types i and j of agents, either
(a) one has a higher valuation of all claims; (b) they have the same valuation for all claims; or (c) their
marginal valuation functions cross once. Since it is assumed that the marginal utlity of consumption in the
middle period is infinity at zero, case (a) cannot be true in equilibrium.
I will now prove the existence of a class structure by construction.
If all types of agents have the same valuation of all claims, then there exists a unique class of agents and
of claims, so that I1 = {1, ..., I}, Ξ1 = [ϵmin, ϵmax] and K = 1.
If not all types of agents have the same valuation of all claims, then pick the type(s) of agents who have
the highest (common) valuation of claims with risk level ϵ∗0 = ϵmin, and denote by I1 ⊂ {1, ..., I} the set of
all types of agents with that same valuation for these claims. From our anlaysis above it is clear that viϵ = v
j
ϵ
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for all ϵ for (i, j) 2 I1× I1, and that there exists ϵ∗1 ≡ minj ϵij for i 2 I1 and j /2 I1 such that viϵ > (=)[<]vjϵ
for all ϵ < (=)[>]ϵ∗1 for i 2 I1 and all j /2 I1. We thus have that agents of type i 2 I1 hold onto claims with
ϵ 2 Ξ1 = [ϵ∗0, ϵ∗1], and no other types hold onto claims with ϵ 2 [ϵ∗0, ϵ∗1).
Let I2 ≡ {j 2 {1, ..., I} : ϵij = ϵ∗1 for i 2 I1}. From our anlaysis above it is clear that viϵ = vjϵ for all ϵ for
any (i, j) 2 I2 × I2. If I1 [ I2 = {1, ..., I}, then the class structure contains two classes of agents and claims
with agents from the second class holding onto all claims with risk ϵ 2 Ξ2 = [ϵ∗1, ϵmax]; if not, then there
exists ϵ∗2 ≡ minj ϵij for i 2 I2 and j /2 (I1 [ I2) such that viϵ > (=)[<]vjϵ for all ϵ < (=)[>]ϵ∗2 for i 2 I2 and
all j /2 (I1 [ I2). In this case we have that agents of type i 2 I2 hold onto claims with ϵ 2 Ξ2 = [ϵ∗1, ϵ∗2], and
no other types hold onto claims with ϵ 2 (ϵ∗1, ϵ∗2). And so on and so forth until we reach the class K such
that I1 [ I2 [ ...[ IK = {1, ..., I} and ΞK = [ϵ∗K−1, ϵmax].
(ii) This part follows directly from the facts that (a) it must be that ∆i > ∆j for all types i and j such that
viϵ > v
j
ϵ for all ϵ < ϵ
ij , viϵ = v
j
ϵ for ϵ = ϵ
ij , and viϵ > v
j
ϵ for all ϵ > ϵ
ij , and that (b) we know from part (i) of
the proposition that type-i agents belong to a class holding onto lower-ϵ claims than type-j agents.!
Proof of Lemma 2: Assuming that Assumption 2 holds, we can ignore corner solutions. The first-order
conditions characterizing an agent’s trading choice in the middle period are therefore
r!ϵ ×A!θ!u0(A!r! · d!(x)) = r!ϵ × U 0(r! · (x− d!(x))), for all ϵ.
We thus have that
A!θ!(A!α!r! · x)−γ = ((1− α!)r! · x)−γ ,
which yields the result.!
Proof of Lemma 4: The two expressions in (23) are equivalent to
1 + E1
1− π1−πE1
=
Σh
Σl
× 1− µ
1 + µ1Σl
1− µ1 + µ1Σh ×
1 + E
1− π1−πE
, (A4)
X1 =
Σ!
1− µ1 + µ1Σ! ×
1 + E!
1 + E1,!K for some !, (A5)
where Eh ≡ E , E l ≡ −(π/(1 − π))E , and Σ! ≡ eσ1,!/eσ2,! > 1 for all !. There clearly exists a unique E1
solving (A4), and given this unique E1 there exists a unique X1 given by (A5) for a chosen !. This proves
that if a NSE exists, then it is unique.
(ii) It is straightforward to show that Σl ≥ Σh if and only if (eσ1,l/eσ1,h) × (eσ2,h/eσ2,l) ≥ 1, with strict
inequality if (σ1,l/eσ1,h) × (eσ2,h/eσ2,l) > 1. We then have directly from (A4) that E1 ≤ E2 if and only if
(eσ1,l/eσ1,h) × (eσ2,h/eσ2,l) ≥ 1, with strict inequality if (eσ1,l/eσ1,h) × (eσ2,h/eσ2,l) > 1. However, (eσ1,l/eσ1,h) ×
(eσ2,h/eσ2,l) ≥ 1 if and only if (Al)1−γθl ≥ (Ah)1−γθh, with strict inequality if (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh, which
proves (ii).
(i) To prove this result it is useful to use the §act that the following two equations are equivalent to the
two (23):
1 + E1,l
1 + E1,h ×
1 + E2,h
1 + E2,l =
 eσ1,leσ1,h × eσ
2,h
eσ2,l
!1/γ
, and (A6)
X1
X2
=
 eσ1,!eσ2,!
!1/γ
× 1 + E
2,!
1 + E1,! for one !. (A7)
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We have from (A7) for state h that X1 > X2 whenever E1 ≤ E2, and from (A7) for state l we obtain that
X1 > X2 whenever E1 ≥ E2. Hence, if a NSE exists it is such that X1 > X2.!
Proof of Lemma 5: I first prove that if a SE exists, then it is such that (i) X1 > X2, and (ii)
E1 < (=)[>]E2 if and only if (Al)1−γθl > (=)[<](Ah)1−γθh. I then prove that if a SE exists, it is unique.
(i) Assume first that a SE exists and displays positive sorting, so that E1 < E2. Since then type-1 agents
hold onto the safer claims and type-2 agents hold onto the riskier claims, it must be that type-1 (2) consumers
have a higher marginal value of consumption in state l (h) - for otherwise either type-1 or type-2 agents would
be holding all claims, which cannot be true in equilibrium. That is, eσ1,l[(1+E1,l)X1]−γ > eσ2,l[(1+E2,l)X2]−γ
and eσ1,h[(1 + E1,h)X1]−γ < eσ2,h[(1 + E2,h)X2]−γ . This then implies that
1 + E1,l
1 + E1,h ×
1 + E2,h
1 + E2,l <
 eσ1,leσ1,h × eσ
2,h
eσ2,l
!1/γ
.
Since E1 < E2, we have that the left-hand side is strictly greater than 1, thereby implying that the right-hand
side is also strictly greater than 1, which in turn implies that (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh. Now assume that
(Al)1−γθl ≤ (Ah)1−γθh. We then have that (eσ1,l/eσ1,h)× (eσ2,h/eσ2,l) ≤ 1, which in turn implies that E1 ≥ E2,
which yields a contradiction. It thus follows that a SE displays positive sorting, i.e., E1 < E2, if and only if
(Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh.
Now assume that a SE exists and displays negative sorting so that E1 > E2. Since type-1 agents hold
onto the riskier claims and type-2 agents hold onto the safer claims ,it must be that type-1 (2) consumers
have a higher marginal value of consumption in state h (l) - for otherwise either type-1 or type-2 agents
would be holding all claims, which cannot be true in equilibrium. That is, it must be that eσ1,l(1+E1,l)−γ <eσ2,l(1 + E2,l)−γ and eσ1,h(1 + E1,h)−γ > eσ2,h(1 + E2,h)−γ . This then implies that
1 + E1,l
1 + E1,h ×
1 + E2,h
1 + E2,l >
 eσ1,leσ1,h × eσ
2,h
eσ2,l
!1/γ
.
Since E1 > E2 we have that the left-hand side is strictly less than 1, thereby implying that the right-
hand side is also strictly less than 1, which in turn implies that (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh. Now assume
that (Al)1−γθl ≥ (Ah)1−γθh. We then have that (eσ1,l/eσ1,h) × (eσ2,h/eσ2,l) ≥ 1, which in turn implies that
E1 ≤ E2, which yields a contradiction. It thus follows that a SE displays negative sorting if and only if
(Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh.
(ii) Furthermore, since eσ1,h[(1 + E1,h)X1]−γ < eσ2,h[(1 + E2,h)X2]−γ in a SE with positive sorting, andeσ1,l[(1 + E1,l)X1]−γ < eσ2,l[(1 + E2,l)X2]−γ in a SE with negative sorting, we have that in the former case eσ1,heσ2,h
!1/γ
<
(1 + E1,h)X1
(1 + E2,h)X2 ,
while in the latter  eσ1,leσ2,l
!1/γ
<
(1 + E1,l)X1
(1 + E2,l)X2 .
Since in the former case E1 < E2, while in the latter E1 > E2, it must be that X1 > X2 in both cases.
I now prove that if a SE exists, then it is unique. I prove the result by a series of contradictions. Assume
first that a SE exists and displays positive sorting, in which case it must be that there exists ϵ∗(X1, E1) such
35
that
v1ϵ (X
1, E1)
8>><>>:
>
=
<
v2ϵ
%
K − µ1X1
1− µ1 ,
EK − µ1E1X1
K − µ1X1
&
for ϵ
8>><>>:
<
=
>
ϵ∗.
If another SE with positive sorting exists characterized by ( bX1, bE1) and is such that the cuto§ is ϵ∗( bX1, bE1) <
ϵ∗(X1, E1), then type-1 (2) agents must consume less (more) in both states so that v1ϵ ( bX1, bE1) > v1ϵ (X1, E1)
for all ϵ while v2ϵ ( bX2, bE2) < v2ϵ (X2, E2) for all ϵ. But this implies that v1ϵ ( bX1, bE1) = v2ϵ ( bX2, bE2) for ϵ >
ϵ∗(X1, E1), a contradiction. And if we assume instead that another SE with positive sorting exists and is
such that the cuto§ is ϵ∗( bX1, bE1) > ϵ∗(X1, E1), then type-1 (2) agents must consume more (less) in both
states so that v1ϵ ( bX1, bE1) < v1ϵ (X1, E1) for all ϵ while v2ϵ ( bX2, bE2) > v2ϵ (X2, E2) for all ϵ. But this implies that
v1ϵ (
bX1, bE1) = v2ϵ ( bX2, bE2) for ϵ < ϵ∗(X1, E1), again a contradiction.
If we instead assume that a SE exists and displays negative sorting, we can redo all the steps above, but
switching the indices for consumers of type 1 and 2. This conclude the proof that if a SE exists, then it is
unique.!
Proof of Proposition 4: It is useful for the proof to rewrite the NSE conditions. The system of two
equations (A6) and (A7) is equivalent to
Φ(X1, E1) = 0, and (A8)
Ψ!(X1, E1) = 0 for some !, (A9)
where
Φ(X1, E1) ≡ 1−
π
1−πE1
1 + E1 ×
1 + KE−µ
1X1E1
K−µ1X1
1− π1−π KE−µ
1X1E1
K−µ1X1
−
 eσ1,leσ1,h × eσ
2,h
eσ2,l
!1/γ
,
and
Ψ!(X1, E1) ≡ (1− µ
1)X1
K − µ1X1
1 + E1,!
1 + E2,! −
 eσ1,!eσ2,!
!1/γ
.
One can simplify the above expressions for and to
Φ(X1, E1) ≡ 1−
π
1−πE1
1 + E1 ×
K(1 + E)−µ1X1(1 + E1)
K(1− π1−πE)−µ1X1(1− π1−πE1)
−
 eσ1,leσ1,h × eσ
2,h
eσ2,l
!1/γ
,
and
Ψh(X1, E1) ≡ (1− µ
1)X1(1 + E1)
K(1 + E)−µ1X1(1 + E1) −
 eσ1,heσ2,h
!1/γ
, and
Ψl(X1, E1) ≡ (1− µ
1)X1(1− π1−πE1)
K(1− π1−πE)−µ1X1(1− π1−πE1)
−
 eσ1,leσ2,l
!1/γ
.
Note that if Φ(X1, E1) = 0 and Ψ!(X1, E1) = 0 for some !, then Ψ!0(X1, E1) = 0 for !0 6= !. And we have
that Φ(X1, E1) is strictly decreasing in E1 and it is strictly increasing (constant ) [decreasing] with X1 for
E1 < E (E1 = E) [E1 > E ]. Furthermore, we also have that for each ! Ψ!(X1, E1) is strictly increasing in
X1, while Ψl(X1, E1) is strictly decreasing in E1 and Ψh(X1, E1) is strictly increasing in E1.
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(i) First, there always exists a solution (X1, E1) to the system of two equations (A8)-(A9), which would
be the unique NSE if we were to ignore the constraint imposed by the distribution of risk for claims G.
To prove uniqueness of the equilibrium I first show in part (a) that if a NSE exists, then a SE does not
exist. Then I show in part (b) that if a NSE does not exist, then a SE exists.
(a) Suppose a NSE exists and let it be characterized by (X1, E1).
Assume first that (Al)1−γθl ≥ (Ah)1−γθh. KeepX1 (and thereforeX2) constant and set bE1 = E1min(X1) <
E1, so that bE2 = E2max(X1) > E2. That is, type-1 consumers hold onto all claims below a certain risk levelbϵ1 such that the average risk of their portfolio is E1min(X1). We then have that
eσ1,lU 0((1 + bE1,l)X1) < eσ1,lU 0((1 + E1,l)X1)
= eσ2,lU 0((1 + E2,l)X2) < eσ2,lU 0((1 + bE2,l)X2),
and
eσ1,hU 0((1 + bE1)X1) > eσ1,hU 0((1 + E1)X1)
= eσ2,hU 0((1 + E2)X2) > eσ2,hU 0((1 + bE2)X2),
which implies that there exists ϵ∗(X1, bE1) such that v1ϵ (X1, bE1) < (=)[>]v2ϵ (X2, bE2) for ϵ < (=)[>]ϵ∗(X1, bE1).
This cannot be an equilibrium, for it implies that type-2 consumers hold onto the safest claims. If we decrease
X1 to eX1 by deceasing the maximum risk level of the claims held by type-1 consumers, which mechanically
increases the size of the portfolio of type-2 consumers by decreasing the minimum risk level of the claims
they hold and let eE1 = E1min( eX1). This implies that the marginal valuation of all claims increases for type-1
consumers and decreases for type-2 consumers, thereby implying that there exists ϵ∗( eX1, eE1) < ϵ∗(X1, bE1)
such that v1ϵ ( eX1, eE1) < (=)[>]v2ϵ ( eX1, eE1) for ϵ < (=)[>]ϵ∗( eX1, eE1). That is, type-1 consumers are still the
ones holding the riskier assets, which cannot be true in an equilibrium with no or positive sorting. And we
reach the same conclusion if one instead increases X1.
A symmetric reasoning holds when (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh. It thus follows that if a NSE exists, then a
SE cannot exist.
(b) Assume that (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh, and that the solution to (A8)-(A9) is such that E1 < E1min(X1),
i.e., a NSE does not exists. Then keep X1 constant but set bE1 = E1min(X1). We then have that
eσ1,lU 0((1 + bE1,l)X1) > eσ1,lU 0((1 + E1,l)X1)
= eσ2,lU 0((1 + E2,l)X2) > eσ2,lU 0((1 + bE2,l)X2),
and
eσ1,hU 0((1 + bE1)X1) < eσ1,hU 0((1 + E1)X1)
= eσ2,hU 0((1 + E2)X2) < eσ2,hU 0((1 + bE2)X2),
thereby implying that ∆1 > ∆2, i.e., the marginal valuation of claims for type-1 consumers is now steeper
than that of type-2 consumers. If ϵ∗(X1, bE1) = ϵ1min(X1), where ϵ1min(X1) is such thatZ ϵ1min(X1)
ϵmin
ϵKdG(ϵ)
µ1
= E1min(X1),
then we have found an SE. If instead ϵ∗(X1, bE1) < ϵ1min(X1), then continuously decrease X1 so that E1min(X1)
and ϵ1min(X
1) continuously decrease, thereby implying that v1ϵ shifts up and v
2
ϵ shift down for all ϵ, which
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implies that ϵ∗ such that v1ϵ∗ = v
2
ϵ∗ increases. And do so until reaching bX1 such that v1ϵ = v2ϵ for ϵ = ϵ1min( bX1).
If instead bϵ > ϵ1min(X1), then do the opposite and continuously increase X1 until reaching bX1 such that
v1ϵ = v
2
ϵ for ϵ = ϵ
1
min(
bX1).
A symmetric reasoning applies if (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh when E1 > E1max(X1).
(ii) Assume that (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh. To prove the result I first need a number of properties of the
functions. First, eσ1,!/eσ2,! increases for both ! as η increases. Moreover, since (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh, we
also have that
d(eσ1,l/eσ2,l)
dη
>
d(eσ1,h/eσ2,h)
dη
. (A10)
Finally,
dΨl(X1, E1)
dX1
>
dΨh(X1, E1)
dX1
. (A11)
In fact,
dΨl(X1, E1)
dX1
=
(1− µ1)(1 + E1)(1 + E)K
[K(1 + E)− µ1X1(1 + E1)]2 , wile
dΨh(X1, E1)
dX1
=
(1− µ1)(1− π1−πE1)(1 + E)K
[K(1− π1−πE)− µ1X1(1− π1−πE1)]2
,
implying that
dΨl(X1, E1)
dX1
>
dΨh(X1, E1)
dX1
if and only if
[K(1 + E)]× [K(1− π
1− πE)] > [µ
1X1(1 + E1)]× [µ1X1(1− π
1− πE
1)],
which must be true since type-2 agents must choose portfolios that ensure they consume non-zero amounts
in each state.
I can now turn my attention to the proof itself. First, if η = 0, then (eσ1,l/eσ1,h) × (eσ2,h/eσ2,l) = 1, in
which case Φ(X1, E1) = 0 implies that E1 = E > Emin(X1). Then, as η increases, eσ1,l/eσ2,l and eσ1,h/eσ2,h
increase, with (A10) implying that ceteris paribus 0 > Ψh(X1, E1) > Ψl(X1, E1). And since Ψ!(X1, E1) is
strictly increasing in X1 for each !, while Ψl(X1, E1) is strictly decreasing in E1 and Ψh(X1, E1) is strictly
increasing in E1, it thus must be that X1 increases when η increases. And X1 converges to K/µ1 as η
converges to σ, because eσ1,!/eσ2,!, ! 2 {h, l}, converges to infinity as η converges to σ. Hence, Emin(X1)
increases as X1 increases, and it converges to E as X1 goes to K/µ1.
However, (A11), together with the fact that X1 increases with η, implies that E1 decreases as η increases.
There therefore exists η∗ 2 (0,σ) such that Emin(X1(η∗)) ≤ E1(η∗), with strict inequality for η > η∗, which
implies that a NSE no longer exists when η ≥ η∗.
The proof is symmetric if one instead assumes that (Al)1−γθl < (Ah)1−γθh.!
Proof of Lemmata (6)-(8): The only element that does not directly follow from the assumptions is
that the pricing function is always strictly increasing when (Al)1−γθl > (Ah)1−γθh. In this case we know
that E1 < E2, and therefore that ∆1 ≥ ∆2. I will now prove that ∆2 cannot be negative, which implies that
∆1 cannot be negative either. Suppose that ∆2 < 0. Since eσi,l > eσi,h for both i, ∆2 < 0 only if E2 < 0. This
would in turn imply that E1 < 0, which cannot be true since E > 0. We therefore obtain a contradiction.!
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) We know from proposition 4 that there exists a unique NSE for a given
set of parameters. However, X1 and eE1 such that Φ(X1, eE1; eE) = 0 are the unique solution to the system of
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two equations (A3) when the portfolio risk is eE . This implies that the portfolio sizes for type-1 and type-2
consumers do not change when portfolio risk changes.
Let eE i ≡ E i +∆E i. From Ψh(X1, E1; E) = Ψh(X1, E1; eE) = 0 we have that
∆E1
∆E2 =
1 + E1
1 + E2 .
Hence, we have that ∆E i > 0 for i = 1, 2. Moreover, since we have that E1 < (=)[>]E2 for (Al)1−γθl > (=
)[<](Ah)1−γθh, it follows that ∆E1 < (=)[>]∆E2 whenever (Al)1−γθl > (=)[<](Ah)1−γθh.
(ii) Since we assume that the equilibrium is initially and remains a NSE, we can use the valuation of
type-1 agents to price all claims. The size of their portfolio does not change, while the risk of their portfolio
increases. This implies that ((1 + E1,l)X1))−γ (((1 + E1,h)X1)−γ), their marginal valuation of consumption
in state l (h) increases (decreases) since they have less (more) resources in that state, both as an early and
as a late consumer. Furthermore, the change in marginal utility of consumption in the two states are such
that |∆(1 + E1,l)X1))−γ | > |∆((1 + E1,h)X1)−γ |. Since in a NSE
qϵ = v
i
ϵ(x
i) = π(1 + ϵ)eσi,h((1 + E1,h)X1)−γ + (1− π)(1− π
1− π ϵ)eσi,l((1 + E1,l)X1))−γ for i = 1, 2,
it follows that qϵ(eE) < qϵ(E) for ϵ = (1 − π)/π, and that when eσi,l ≥ eσi,h, then eσi,l|∆(1 + E1,l)X1))−γ | >eσi,h|∆((1 + E1,h)X1)−γ | and therefore q0(eE) > q0(E). Hence, if eσi,l ≥ eσi,h, then there exists a cuto§bϵ 2 (0, (1− π) /π) such that qϵ(eE) > qϵ(E) for all ϵ < bϵ, while qϵ(eE) ≥ qϵ(E) for all ϵ ≥ bϵ, with strict
inequality for ϵ > bϵ.!
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Figure 1: Example of a class structure with 3 classes, where agents of 
type i, j, and k respectively belong to class 1, 2, and 3. 
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